The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2012 Year in Review by unknown
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 20 | Number 4 Article 5
2014
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2012 Year
in Review
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business
Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2012 Year in Review, 20 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 565 (2014)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol20/iss4/5
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
ACT: 2012 YEAR IN REVIEW
Crowell & Moring LLP*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FSIA ........................ 567
II. THE DEFINITION OF A FOREIGN STATE:
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS, AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES .................................. 568
A. WHAT IS A "FOREIGN STATE?" .. ....................... 568
1. Political Subdivision ............................... 569
2. Agency or Instrumentality ......................... 569
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL GRANT OF
IM M U N ITY .............................................. 573
A . W AIVER ............................................... 573
B. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY-§ 1605(A)(2) ................ 577
1. What Acts Are Considered "Commercial"? ........ 577
2. What Acts Create a Nexus with the United
States? ............................................ 580
C. TAKINGS-§ 1605(A)(3) ............................... 585
D. NON-COMMERCIAL TORTS-§ 1605(A)(5) .............. 587
E. ARBITRATION-§ 1605(A)(6) .......................... 588
F. TERRORISM-§ 1605A AND §1605(A)(7) ............... 590
1. Implementation of § 1605A ........................ 590
2. Claims by Foreign Nationals ....................... 592
3. Choice of Law Issues .............................. 592
4. D am ages .......................................... 594
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS AGAINST FOREIGN
SOVEREIGNS ........................................... 598
A. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY FROM ATTACHMENT ........... 599
B. THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION TO
IMMUNITY FROM ATTACHMENT ....................... 600
1. Defining "Commercial Activity" ................... 601
C. EXCEPTIONS TO THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
EXCEPTION ............................................ 603
1. The Military Activity Exception .................... 603
2. The Central Bank Exception ....................... 603
D. ENFORCEMENT IN TERRORISM CASES ................. 604
This review was authored by Crowell & Moring attorneys Aryeh S. Portnoy, Lau-
rel Pyke Malson, Joanna Coyne, Moreen O'Brien, Jesse Kirchner, Aral
Bouhabib, Kate Molony, Namrata Kotwani and Louisa Marion.
566 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 20
V. PRACTICAL ISSUES IN FSIA LITIGATION ........... 605
A. ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE ............................. 605
B. SERVICE OF PROCESS .................................. 607
C. DUE PROCESS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION .......... 608
D. JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY .......................... 610
E. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS ................................. 612
F. VENUE AND FORUM NON CON VENIENS ............... 612
G. INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL ............................. 614
ABSTRACT
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (ESIA),
provides the exclusive basis for suing a foreign sovereign in U.S. courts.
While the FSIA generally grants immunity to foreign sovereigns, it also
lays out a number of exceptions under which U.S. courts may exercise ju-
risdiction. Plaintiffs have thus used this statute as a basis to sue foreign
governments and their agencies and instrumentalities in a variety of con-
texts, ranging from purely commercial disputes to wrongful death claims
on behalf of victims of state-sponsored terrorism. The purpose of this Re-
view is to provide an overview of the primary areas of litigation under the
FSIA through an analysis of judicial decisions invoking the statute in 2012.
INTRODUCTION: THE FSIA IN 2012
ITIGATION involving foreign sovereigns in the United States is
on the rise. In recent years, the number of reported decisions dis-
cussing the FSIA has increased considerably. This increase is at-
tributable to a variety of circumstances that continued to play out in
FSIA jurisprudence in 2012.
Ever increasing globalization of business and the increased use of inter-
national arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism (with enforcement
left to domestic courts) have resulted in an increase in purely commercial
litigation involving foreign states. Consequently, substantial litigation in
2012 centered around the "commercial activity" exception under the
FSIA, including the pivotal questions of whether acts are "governmental"
or "commercial" when undertaken by sovereign entities or their agencies
and instrumentalities, and how close a nexus such acts must have to the
United States to fall within the statute's exemptions. While the courts
continue to grapple with these issues, decisions in 2012 provided welcome
guidance in this constantly evolving area of the FSIA.
Overall, FSIA cases in 2012 continued to address the core issues facing
foreign sovereigns in U.S. litigation, including:
* Who is a "foreign state" subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts?
" What acts are sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to move forward with
U.S. litigation against foreign sovereign entities?
" When may plaintiffs pursue foreign sovereign assets located in the
United States to satisfy U.S. court judgments?
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This review will focus on the answers to those questions provided by
U.S. courts in 2012. This review also includes a short introduction to the
FSIA as well as some practical guidance based on the most recent FSIA
decisions.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FSIA
Foreign sovereigns have enjoyed immunity from suit in U.S. courts for
nearly two centuries. As early as 1812,1 U.S. courts generally declined to
assert jurisdiction over cases involving foreign government defendants, a
practice rooted in a sense of "grace and comity" between the United
States and other nations.2 Judges instead deferred to the views of the
Executive Branch as to whether such cases should proceed in U.S. courts,
exercising jurisdiction only where the U.S. State Department expressly
referred claims for their consideration. 3
In 1952, U.S. courts' jurisdiction over claims against foreign states and
their agents expanded significantly when the U.S. State Department is-
sued the so-called "Tate Letter" announcing the Department's adoption
of a new "restrictive theory" of foreign sovereign immunity 4 to guide
courts in invoking jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. The "Tate Letter"
directed that state sovereigns continue to be entitled to immunity from
suits involving their sovereign, or "public," acts.5 But acts taken in a
commercial, or "private," capacity no longer would be protected from
U.S. court review. 6 Yet, even with this new guidance, courts continued to
seek the Executive Branch's views on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether to assert jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns-a system that
risked inconsistency and susceptibility to "diplomatic pressures rather
than to the rule of law."'7
In 1976, Congress sought to address this problem by enacting the FSIA,
essentially codifying the "restrictive theory" of immunity, and empower-
ing the courts to resolve questions of sovereign immunity without resort
to the Executive Branch.8 Today, the FSIA provides the "sole basis" for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. courts.9
The FSIA provides that "foreign states"-including their "political
subdivisions" and "agencies or instrumentalities" 0-shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless one of the exceptions to immu-
1. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
2. See generally Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)
(explaining the history of the FSIA).
3. See id.
4. Id. at 486-87.
5. Id. at 487.
6. Id.
7. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2008) (quot-
ing Chuidian v. Phil. Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990)).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006).
9. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 428 (1989).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
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nity set forth in the statute applies.'1 The FSIA includes several provi-
sions that define the scope of a foreign state's immunity, and establishes
detailed procedural requirements for bringing claims against a sovereign
defendant. 12
The exceptions to immunity are set forth in sections 1605 and 1605A of
the FSIA.13 These exceptions include, inter alia, certain claims based on
commercial activities, expropriation of property, and tortious or terrorist
acts by foreign sovereign entities. 14 In most instances, where a claim falls
under one of the FSIA exceptions, the act provides that the foreign state
shall be subject to jurisdiction in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual.1 5 The FSIA also includes separate provisions es-
tablishing immunity (and exceptions to immunity) from the attachment,
in aid of execution of a judgment against a foreign state or its agencies or
instrumentalities, of property located in the United States.' 6 Finally, the
FSIA sets forth various unique procedural rules for claims against foreign
states, including, e.g., special rules for service of process, default judg-
ments, and appeals.1 7
II. THE DEFINITION OF A FOREIGN STATE: POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS, AGENCIES, AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES
A. WHAT IS A "FOREIGN STATE? '
A threshold issue in any case brought under the FSIA is whether the
defendant person or entity constitutes a "foreign state," and therefore is
generally entitled to immunity from litigation and judgment execution.' 8
For purposes of the FSIA, "foreign states" include not only the states
themselves (i.e., the states writ-large or their political subdivisions), but
also their agencies and instrumentalities. 19 As discussed further below in
Section II. B., agencies and instrumentalities may be subject to different
statutory rules than a state itself or its political subdivisions.
Determining whether an entity is a "foreign state"-and therefore enti-
tled to the protections of the FSIA-is a fact-specific inquiry, requiring
careful attention to the entity's nature and functions. The following sec-
11. See id. § 1604.
12. See id. § 1605.
13. Id. §§ 1605-1605A.
14. Id.
15. See id. § 1606. But see id. § 1605A (providing federal statutory cause of action for
terrorism-related acts).
16. See id. §§ 1609-1611. For example, property belonging to a foreign central bank or
monetary authority and held for its own account is immune from suit absent a
waiver. Id. § 1611(b)(1). Likewise, military property held by a military authority
and used or intended to be used in connection with a military activity is immune
from attachment. Id. § 1611(b)(2).
17. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(g), 1608.
18. See id. § 1604.
19. Id. § 1603(a).
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tions illustrate how U.S. courts determined the status of a variety of enti-
ties under the FSIA in 2012.
1. Political Subdivision
Governmental Ministries and Bureaus-Foreign State.] Several Dis-
trict of Columbia district courts considered in 2012 whether Iran's Minis-
try of Information and Security (MOIS) was a "political subdivision...
or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."'20 The courts consid-
ered specifically whether MOIS was "an integral part of a foreign state's
political structure. '21 In Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, for example,
the court concluded that MOIS was a "foreign state" for purposes of the
FSIA, because it was a division of the Iranian state and "acted as a con-
duit for the state's provision of funds to terrorist organizations.
22
Applying a similar analysis, the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York found that the Taiwanese Bureau of Labor Insurance
had made a prima facie case that it was an agency or instrumentality of
Taiwan by offering evidence that the Bureau was (1) a political branch of
the Republic of China, (2) created for a national purpose, and (3) estab-
lished under Taiwanese law to "handle labor insurance affairs" under the
authority of the Chinese Executive Branch.2 3
2. Agency or Instrumentality
To qualify as an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state, an entity
must be (1) a "separate legal person," that is (2) "neither a citizen of a
State of the United States ... nor created under the laws of any third
country" and (3) either "an organ of a foreign state or political subdivi-
sion thereof" or an entity, "a majority of whose shares or other ownership
interest is owned by [the] foreign state or a political subdivision
thereof. "24
The FSIA does not provide a specific test for determining whether an
entity is an "organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof"-the
third prong of the definition of "agency or instrumentality. '25 In practice,
the courts have continued to consider a variety of factors in determining
20. Id.
21. Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.D.C. 2012).
22. See id. at 51; see also Fain v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 856 F. Supp. 2d 109, 119
(D.D.C. 2012) (concluding same); Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp.
2d 24, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (same).
23. See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 480 B.R. 501,
510-11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (emphasis added). The phrase "not created under the laws of
any third country" reflects the requirement that the entity must have been created
under the laws of the country of which it purports to be an agency or instrumental-
ity. See Aluminum Distribs., Inc. v. Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill Co., No. 87 C
6477, 1989 WL 64174, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 1989) (stating "GARMCO is created
under the laws of Bahrain, one of the owner nations. Hence, it is not created under
the laws of a third nation, and it is a foreign state under § 1603.").
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).
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whether an entity is an "organ. ' 26 For example, in Hausler v. JP Morgan
Chase, N.A., 27 the district court applied a series of factors established by
the Second Circuit in order to determine whether certain Cuban banks
were "organs" of Cuba:
Although there is no specific test for "organ" status under the FSIA,
various factors are relevant: (1) whether the foreign state created the
entity for a national purpose; (2) whether the foreign state actively
supervises the entity; (3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring
of public employees and pays their salaries; (4) whether the entity
holds exclusive rights to some right in the [foreign] country; and (5)
how the entity is treated under foreign state law.28
The court noted that the Second Circuit's test does not favor any par-
ticular factor, or require that each weigh in the analysis. 29 In Hausler, the
undisputed evidence that the banks were state-owned entities created
under Cuban laws granting specific powers by the Cuban Government
and were operated by executives selected by Cuban politicians was suffi-
cient to show that the banks were "organs" of Cuba.30
Applying the same factors, another New York district court in In re 650
Fifth Ave. & Related Properties found that an Iranian foundation (the
Foundation) and corporation (the Corporation) were organs of Iran
where they were created and operated for a national purpose, the Iranian
government actively supervised and was involved in "all aspects of the
Foundation," and the Ayatollah determined the composition of the
boards of both entities.31
State-Owned Press Agency-Agency or Instrumentality. In Gomes v.
ANGOP, Angola Press Agency, the New York District Court considered
26. See, e.g., Hausler v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 845 F. Supp. 2d 553 (S.D.N.Y
2012).
27. Hausler actually involved a case brought under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act,
but the New York district court considered whether certain Cuban banks would be
considered organs of Cuba under the FSIA. Id.
28. Id. at 572 (citing Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2004)).
29. Id. (citing European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 189, 202
(E.D.N.Y. 2011)).
30. Id. at 573-74.
31. In re 650 Fifth Ave., 881 F. Supp. 2d 533, 549-50, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The court
also found that the Foundation and Corporation met the first requirement under
the FSIA agency or instrumentality test of having separate corporate forms-be-
cause each was a New York-incorporated not-for-profit and partnership, respec-
tively. Id. Interestingly, the court also found the third factor met-that they were
not citizens of a U.S. state-despite their incorporation in New York, because
"formalistic adherence to corporate form [would] work inequity" where the corpo-
rate form was obtained by fraudulent representations designed to "obscure owner-
ship by Iran." Id. at 552-53. Other factors the court found significant included: a
government-created entity controlled the Foundation's assets; the government at
various points directed changes to the composition of the Foundation's board; the
Foundation used funds from an Iranian instrumentality to purchase a New York
property, then contributed that property as capital to form the Corporation; the
purpose of the Corporation was to receive tax-free rent on the property; and the
Foundation consulted with the Iranian government about the formation of the
Corporation. See id. at 538-43.
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the Angola Press Agency's (ANGOP) defense that it was Angola's
"agency or instrumentality" and therefore was entitled to immunity.32
Applying traditional corporate veil-piercing standards, the Court ex-
plained: "ri]t is well settled that 'duly created instrumentalities of a for-
eign state are to be accorded a presumption of independent status,"'
which Plaintiff could overcome only by showing that: "(1) ANGOP 'is so
extensively controlled by [Angola] that a relationship of principal and
agent is created' or (2) recognition of ANGOP's separate juridical status
'would work fraud or injustice."33 The court found that the plaintiff
failed to make either showing.34 Although the plaintiff argued that minis-
try officials "clearly approved" the tortious conduct at issue in the suit
(publication of his photographs), the court noted that "[j]oint participa-
tion in a tort is not the classic abuse of corporate form that warrants
piercing the independent status of [a] foreign corporate entity. ' '35
Corporation Owned by State-Owned Enterprise-Not Agency or In-
strumentality. In First Investment Corporation of the Marshall Islands v.
Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd, the Louisiana District Court considered
whether an entity that was majority-owned by a wholly state-owned en-
tity could meet the definition of an "agency or instrumentality. '36 In an
action to confirm an arbitral award under the New York Convention, De-
fendant Mawei argued that there was no basis for the Court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over it under the FSIA.37 The court found that
Mawei was not an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" as de-
fined in the statute-and therefore was not entitled to immunity under
the FSIA 38-because "a majority of [its] shares or other ownership inter-
est [was] owned" not by a foreign state or political subdivision, but by a
Chinese state-owned enterprise. 39 The Court noted that "only direct
ownership of a majority of shares by the foreign state satisfies the statu-
tory requirement. 40
32. Gomes v. ANGOP, Angl. Press Agency, No. 11-CV-0580, 2012 WL 3637453, at
*12 (E.D.N.Y Aug. 22, 2012).
33. Id. at *13.
34. Id.
35. Id. at *13 (internal quotations omitted).
36. First Inv. Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 858 F.
Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. La. 2012), affd on other grounds, 703 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2012).
37. Id. at 670.
38. Because Mawei was not entitled to immunity under the FSIA, the court proceeded
to consider whether Louisiana's long-arm statute authorized personal jurisdiction
over Mawei. Id. at 672.
39. Id. at 671; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).
40. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 671 (emphasis added); see also
Bayerische Landesbank, N.Y. Branch v. Aladdin Capital Mgmt. LLC, 692 F.3d 42,
48 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[A] subsidiary of a sovereign's instrumentality is not itself
an instrumentality." (emphasis in original)). By contrast, in GSS Grp. Ltd v. Nat'l
Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2012), the D.C. Circuit found decisive in
considering whether the National Port Authority of Liberia was an agency or in-
strumentality of the state that the Port Authority was wholly owned by the Libe-
rian government. See also Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 855 F. Supp. 2d 625, 641 (S.D.
Tex. 2012) (Norwegian oil company was an instrumentality of Norway where it was
67 percent owned by the Norwegian state itself).
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The "Core Functions Test":" "Governmental" Versus "Commercial"
Activities. As noted above, an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign
sovereign may be subject to different statutory rules than the "foreign
state" itself or its political subdivisions. In particular, rules relating to
service of process, venue, the availability of punitive damages, and attach-
ment of assets can differ depending on whether the defendant is deemed
an agency of the state or the state itself.41 To make this distinction, courts
apply the so-called "core functions test."' 42 Under this test, if the entity's
predominant activities ("core functions") are "governmental" in nature,
courts will treat the entity as if it were the state itself and apply rules and
standards that are more protective of the sovereign. 43 But if the entity's
"core functions" are predominantly "commercial" in character, courts
will apply the less protective rules and standards reserved for agencies
and instrumentalities of the state.44
In S.K. Innovation, Inc. v. Finpol,45 the District of Columbia district
court discussed how Kazakhstan's Agency on Economic Crimes & Cor-
ruption and its Committee on Penal Enforcement Facilities "fit soundly
within [the] definition" of entities whose "core functions" are govern-
mental. 46 As national law-enforcement agencies, these bodies provided
"important and 'indispensable' governmental functions," including over-
seeing detention and imprisonment facilities and regulating businesses.47
The Court did not find dispositive the fact that these entities were not
constitutional bodies, or part of Kazakhstan's central government, be-
cause "[a]ny government of reasonable complexity must act through men
organized into offices and departments," and "[h]aving a separate name
and some power to conduct its own affairs does not suffice[ ] to make a
foreign department an 'agency' rather than a part of the state itself."'48
The Southern District of New York also applied the core functions test
in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina.49 In that case, the plain-
tiff, who held beneficial interests in defaulted bonds issued by Argentina,
sued an Argentine energy company (ENARSA), arguing that it operated
41. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608(a)-(b) (service of process); 28 U.S.C. §1391(f)(3) (per-
mitting venue in suits against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state "in
any judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do busi-
ness or is doing business"); 28 U.S.C. §1610(a)-(b) (attachment of assets).
42. See e.g., Garb v. Republic of Pol., 440 F.3d 579 (2d Cir. 2006).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 591 (citing Magness v. Russian Fed'n, 247 F.3d 609, 613 n.7 (5th Cir.
2001)).
45. Although S.K. Innovation involved a claim brought under the Alien Tort Claims
Act, the court still considered the threshold issue whether the defendant was enti-
tled to immunity under the FSIA. S.K. Innovation, Inc. v. Finpol, 854 F. Supp. 2d
99, 107 (D.D.C 2012).
46. Id. at 108. The Court also noted other agencies whose core functions the courts
have found to be governmental, including national armed forces, the Iranian Min-
istry of Information and Security, and the Sudanese Ministry of the Interior. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 108-09 (citing Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 153
(D.C. Cir. 1994)).
49. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 892 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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as a political organ of Argentina and therefore should be liable for the
government's debts.50 After noting that ENARSA was owned primarily
by the Republic and was responsible for several seemingly governmental
functions (including providing subsidized energy to the public), the court
determined that ENARSA's core function was the marketing of low-cost
natural gas-which it deemed predominantly commercial.
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III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL GRANT OF IMMUNITY
A. WAIVER
Section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA provides that a foreign sovereign is not
immune from suit in any case "in which the foreign state has waived its
immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any with-
drawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except
in accordance with the terms of the waiver."'52
Explicit waiver occurs where a "foreign state" accepts U.S. court juris-
diction-through a statement, contractual forum selection clause, or
some similar means-with regard to the subject matter being litigated. 53
Implicit waiver can come in various forms, including, inter alia, when:
"(1) a foreign state agrees to arbitration in another country; (2) the for-
eign state agrees that a contract is governed by the laws of a particular
country; [or] (3) the state files a responsive pleading without raising the
immunity defense. '54
Explicit Waiver by Contract. In Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic
Republic of Congo, Themis Capital, LLC and Des Moines Investments,
Ltd. sued the Democratic Republic of Congo and its central bank to en-
force a credit agreement which contained a forum selection clause.5 5 The
defendants asserted sovereign immunity.56 But the New York District
Court denied immunity because the defendants in the agreement had "ir-
revocably submit[ted] to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of" state and fed-
eral courts sitting in New York City.57
Implicit Waiver as Signatory to ICSID Convention. In Blue Ridge In-
vestments, LLC v. Republic of Argentina, Blue Ridge filed a petition in
the Southern District of New York to confirm an arbitral award against
50. Id. at 530.
51. Id. at 531-33. ENARSA also has regulatory functions (it is empowered to "inter-
vene in the market" in response to monopolies and oligopolies), it "manage[s] the
tender process for major public works and energy projects" pursuant to govern-
mental decrees, and it carries out "agreements with other sovereigns. .. developed
by Argentina or the Ministry of Planning." Id. at 532-33.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006).
53. See, e.g., Themis Capital, LLC v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
54. Af-Cap, Inc. v. Congo, 462 F.3d 417, 426 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Rodriguez v.
Transnave, Inc., 8 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1993)).
55. See Themis, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 512, 516-17.
56. Id. at 515.
57. Id. at 516 (quoting the credit agreement) (emphasis omitted).
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Argentina.5 8 Argentina moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter juris-
diction, 59 but Blue Ridge argued Argentina had waived its sovereign im-
munity by signing the Convention on the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (the ICSID Convention).60 The court
explained that in a case involving enforcement of an arbitral award
against a foreign sovereign, "waiver is commonly found ... so long as [1]
the award is rendered pursuant to a convention to which the foreign state
is a signatory, and [2] the convention provides for recognition and en-
forcement of the award in contracting states. '61
The court explained that the award here satisfied both prongs. First,
the arbitral award was issued under the ICSID Convention 62-to which
both Argentina and the United States were signatories. 63 Second, article
54 of the Convention required signatories to "recognize an award ren-
dered pursuant to th[e] Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that State. '64 The court concluded that, as a signa-
tory to the Convention and participant in the ICSID arbitration, "Argen-
tina must have contemplated enforcement actions in other signatory
States, including the United States. ' 65 Argentina thus waived its sover-
eign immunity with respect to enforcement of the arbitral award. 66 On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Ar-
gentina had waived sovereign immunity.67
No Waiver by Constitutional Incorporation of International Law.
Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank involved two suits in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois brought by several Holocaust survivors against several
Hungarian entities, including the national bank and national railway.68
The plaintiffs alleged that these two defendants committed a variety of
torts while "play[ing] critical roles in the expropriation of Jewish property
that was essential to finance the genocide of the Holocaust in Hun-
gary. '"69 The bank and railway each moved to dismiss on sovereign-im-
58. See Blue Ridge Invs., LLC v. Republic of Arg., 902 F. Supp. 2d 367, 370 (S.D.N.Y.
2012), affd in part, 735 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013).
59. See id. at 371.
60. See id. at 373.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 370-71.
63. See id. at 374 & n.5.
64. See Blue Ridge, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 374 (internal quotation marks omitted) (altera-
tion in original); see also 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a) (2004) (implementing article 54 of
the Convention).
65. Blue Ridge, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 374 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
66. See id. at 375.
67. Blue Ridge lnvs., LLC v. Republic of Arg., 735 F.3d 72, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2013). The
court reached the same conclusion under the arbitration exception, which is dis-
cussed more fully in Section III. E.
68. Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2012).
69. Id. at 666.
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munity grounds;70 the district court denied both motions.71 On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit considered plaintiffs' argument that the bank was not
entitled to immunity by virtue of a waiver by the Hungarian State.72 Spe-
cifically, plaintiffs argued that "Hungary implicitly waived its sovereign
immunity by stating in its constitution that the Republic of Hungary ac-
cepts the universally recognized rules and regulations of international
law, and harmonizes the internal laws and statutes of the country with the
obligations assumed under international law."'73 Holding that waiver
under section 1605(a)(1) should be "construed narrowly, ' 74 and must be
supported by "strong evidence that this is what the foreign state in-
tended,' 75 the Seventh Circuit rejected plaintiffs' argument because the
constitution expressed no "intent by the Republic of Hungary to be sub-
ject to suit in U.S. courts."'76
No Waiver By Ambassador's Letter Assuming Responsibility for
Wrongdoing. In Gomes v. ANGOP, Angola Press Agency, the plaintiff
brought a defamation action against, among others, the Angola Press
Agency (ANGOP) for allegedly publishing on the ANGOP website a
photograph of plaintiff that mistakenly identified his image as that of a
known international criminal. 77 Plaintiff argued that defendants waived
their immunity when the Angolan Ambassador to the United States ad-
vised plaintiff that: "If the website in question is that of ANGOP the
government of the Republic of Angola will assume its responsibilities.1 78
The court disagreed, explaining that "[a]n implied waiver is only found in
circumstances in which the waiver was unmistakable and unambigu-
ous."'79 An implicit waiver must, at the very least, "relat[e] to the conduct
of litigation,"80 but the Ambassador's statement was made more than six
months before the suit was filed and it "contain[ed] no express or indirect
reference to a waiver of sovereign immunity." 8'
No Waiver by Granting Power of Attorney. In Universal Trading &
Investment Co. v. Bureau for. Representing Ukrainian Interests in Interna-
70. See Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 807 F. Supp. 2d
689, 697 (N.D. I1. 2011); Victims of the Hungarian Holocaust v. Hungarian State
Rys., 798 F. Supp. 2d 934, 938 (N.D. 111. 2011).
71. Abelesz, 692 F.3d at 666; see also Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 697-98
(relying on expropriation exception but considering both expropriation and waiver
exceptions); Hungarian State Rys., 798 F. Supp. 2d at 938 (relying on expropriation
exception).
72. Abelesz, 692 F.3d at 670.
73. See id. at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 671; cf id. ("[Tihe language of the Hungarian Constitution demonstrates
Hungary's recognition and acceptance of international law norms and obligations,
but it is not a waiver of its sovereign immunity.").
77. See Gomes v. ANGOP, Angola Press Agency, No. l1-CV-0580, 2012 WL 3637453,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2012), affd, No. 12-3826-CV (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 2013).
78. Id. at *14 (internal quotations omitted).
79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted).
81. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tional & Foreign Courts, plaintiffs sued Ukraine, the Ukrainian Prosecu-
tor General's Office, and the Bureau for Representing Ukrainian
Interests in International and Foreign Courts under a variety of contract
and tort theories stemming from the defendants' failure to pay for work
done by the plaintiffs. 82 Among other exceptions, the plaintiffs argued
that the defendants explicitly waived immunity by granting one plaintiff
power of attorney to attach real property in the United States in order to
recover assets expatriated from Ukraine. 83 The court rejected this ex-
plicit waiver argument, finding that the power of attorney contained no
language relating to waiver.8 4 The court also rejected a separate argu-
ment that the agency relationship created by the power of attorney im-
plicitly waived immunity. 85  Explaining that neither an agency
relationship nor a fiduciary relationship implies waiver, the court con-
cluded that the waiver exception did not apply.86
No Waiver by Agreeing to Arbitrate Related Dispute. Moreira v.
Ministerio de Economia y Produccion de la Republica Argentina involved
a long-running dispute between lawyer Jorge Moreira and a former client,
a reinsurance company owned by the Argentine government. 87 In 2002,
Moreira brought a New York arbitration against the reinsurance com-
pany and Argentina's economic ministry to recover legal fees and ex-
penses, and received a favorable award in 2005.88 During that
arbitration, the reinsurance company filed a criminal complaint against
Moreira in Argentina, "claiming that [his] fees were exorbitant, that he
engaged in fraudulent billing practices, and that he had conspired with
[the reinsurance company's] employees to obtain approval of these
bills." 89 The prosecution failed, and Moreira sued the defendants in a
New York district court for malicious prosecution as well as for resulting
business losses and emotional distress.90
The defendants asserted sovereign immunity under the FSIA and
moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 91 Moreira re-
sponded that defendants, by "rais[ing] the issue of fraudulent overbilling
in the New York arbitration, have waived immunity with respect to any
action involving claims of overbilling [as] such claims were the basis for
the Argentine prosecution[ ].-92 Finding that waiver must be "construed
82. Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Bureau for Representing Ukrainian Interests in
Int'l & Foreign Courts, 898 F. Supp. 2d 301, 304, 308 (D. Mass. 2012), aff'd, 727
F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2013).




87. Moreira v. Ministerio de Economia y Produccion de ]a Republica Arg., No. 10-





92. Id. at *3.
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narrowly," the court rejected Moreira's argument,93 concluding that con-
senting to arbitrate a fee dispute "is hardly an unmistakable or unambigu-
ous waiver of... immunity from a separate tort suit seeking damages on
account of ... a criminal prosecution related to the billing in the Argen-
tine courts."'94
B. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY-§ 1605(a)(2)
The "commercial activity" exception remains one of the most fre-
quently litigated aspects of the FSIA as governments continue to be ac-
tive participants in the global marketplace. 95 This exception to foreign
sovereign immunity is codified in Section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA, which
provides that a "foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of" U.S. courts in a case where the action is based:
[(1)] upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or [(2)] upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where; or [(3)] upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where and that act causes a direct effect in the United States...96
In other words, foreign states lose their immunity from suit in the
United States where their actions are commercial and have a nexus to the
United States (i.e., are carried out, or cause a direct effect, in the United
States). 97
1. What Acts Are Considered "Commercial?"
Determining at what point a foreign state's acts cross the line from
governmental to commercial is crucial to the "commercial activity" analy-
sis. The FSIA requires that U.S. courts define a foreign sovereign's acts
by their nature, not their purpose. 98 For example, a foreign sovereign's
decision to enter into a construction contract with a private contractor is
by its nature "commercial," even if the contract is for the uniquely gov-
ernmental purpose of building a military base.99 Although such distinc-
tions are fact-intensive inquiries, they often focus on the core principle
93. Moreira, 2012 WL 6178220, at *3-4.
94. Id. at *4.
95. See, e.g., Lasheen v. Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 485 F. App'x 203
(9th Cir. 2012); Best Med. Belg., Inc. v. Kingdom of Belg., 913 F. Supp. 2d 230
(E.D. Va. 2012); S.K. Innovation, Inc. v. Finpol, 854 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C 2012);
Lantheus Med. Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 841 F.Supp.2d 769 (S.D.N.Y
2012); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 480 B.R. 501
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006).
97. For a discussion of loss of immunity from attachment or enforcement of judgments
in the United States based on commercial activity, see discussion infra section
IV.B.
98. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
99. Tonoga, Ltd. v. Ministry of Pub. Works & Hous. of Saudi Arabia, 135 F. Supp. 2d
350, 356 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
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that commercial acts are those that any private entity could undertake. 100
Governmental acts are those made possible only through power peculiar
to a sovereign. 1 1 Several federal court decisions from 2012 illustrating
this and other relevant points are described below.
Promoting Foreign Investment Opportunities and Incen-
tives-Governmental. In Best Medical Belgium, Inc. v. Kingdom of
Belgium, a Virginia corporation and its Belgian subsidiary sued Belgium
and its trade offices for fraud, breach of contract, and other claims stem-
ming from alleged representations by Belgian trade officials regarding
certain financial incentives and other assistance available for foreign in-
vestors "to help establish business investments" in a particular region of
Belgium. 10 2 Looking to the nature of the acts at issue, the Virginia dis-
trict court concluded that Belgium's promotion of a geographic area and
incentives to invest in Belgian companies did not constitute "commercial
activity [equally] available to private parties."'01 3 Rather, the promotion
of domestic commerce was a "basic-even quintessential-government
function" and was far broader than anything to be expected of a private
entity.'0 4 In addition, the incentives promoted were those that only a
sovereign could provide, such as tax exemptions. 0 5 Belgium therefore
retained its immunity from suit.10 6
Conducting Criminal Investigations in Conjunction with Business
Competitors-GovernmentaL In S.K. Innovation, Inc. v. Finpol, Kazakh-
stani businessmen and U.S. corporations alleged that Kazakhstan's
Agency on Economic Crimes and Corruption (Finpol) and its Committee
on Penal Enforcement Facilities colluded with the plaintiffs' business
competitors to conduct unwarranted criminal investigations into the
plaintiffs' activities. 0 7 The court concluded that such actions were al-
leged "abuses of official power" that private parties could not similarly
undertake in the marketplace. 10 8 That such abuses were allegedly done
for the benefit of private parties was irrelevant, because that fact went
only to the "motive" of the government's acts and did not take away from
the inherently governmental nature of the acts. 10 9
Investing in "Feeder Funds" of U.S. Securities Company-Commer-
ciaL In Securities Investor Protection Corporation v. Bernard L. Madoff
Investment Securities, LLC, the trustee charged with the liquidation of
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and its infamous Ponzi
scheme sued Taiwan's Bureau of Labor Insurance (BLI) for the recovery
100. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359-60 (1993).
101. Id.
102. Best Med. Belg., Inc. v. Kingdom of Belg., 913 F. Supp. 2d 230, 233-34 (E.D. Va.
2012).
103. Id. at 237.
104. Id. at 237-38 (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 238.
106. Id. at 239.
107. S.K. Innovation, Inc. v. Finpol, 854 F. Supp. 2d 99, 103-05 (D.D.C. 2012).
108. Id. at ill.
109. Id. at 112.
2014] FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: 2012 579
of asset transfers that the BLI allegedly received in connection with its
investment in a Madoff "feeder fund."' 1 0 The New York District Court
concluded that the BLI was engaged in commercial activity when it chose
to invest with a Madoff-affiliated investment firm.1 1' Importantly, any
private individual could have made the same investment decisions, and
the BLI used no peculiarly sovereign powers in pursuing its
investments.112
Operating a Nuclear Reactor for the Sale of Medical Isotopes-Con-
mercial. In Lantheus Medical Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co.,
the plaintiff, Lantheus, relied on a Canadian nuclear reactor for the pro-
vision of raw material necessary for its radiopharmaceutical products." 13
After the reactor shut down for an extended period of time, Lantheus
sued its insurer, Zurich, in the Southern District of New York for failing
to indemnify it for financial losses stemming from Lantheus' resulting in-
ability to manufacture and sell its radiopharmaceuticals. 1' 4 As part of its
lawsuit, Lantheus sought the issuance of letters rogatory to obtain evi-
dence from Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), a Canadian
Crown corporation that operated the nuclear reactor. 115 AECL in turn
argued that the FSIA prohibited a U.S. court from issuing the letters. 16
The court concluded that AECL's operation of the nuclear reactor was
commercial, not governmental. 1 7 It distinguished AECL from other
sovereign entities that exploited their countries' natural resources by ex-
plaining how AECL's operation was fundamentally self-interested." 8
Among other things, AECL was not governing others' use of nuclear re-
sources, but rather was "market[ing] itself as a leader in research and
development of nuclear energy, and as a commercial enterprise that sup-
plies a large portion of the worldwide need for medical isotopes." 19 The
court also noted that AECL received attention from the Canadian legis-
lature after the reactor shutdown not because of some preferential status
as a sovereign entity, but because of the commercial importance of its
global sales.' 2 0 And notably, AECL's contractual obligations, not the na-
tional interests of Canada, determined which countries would receive a
supply of medical isotopes. 12' Thus, the operation of the reactor was
110. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 480 BR. 501,
506-09 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
111. Id. at 511-12.
112. ld. at 512. See generally Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Bureau for Representing
Ukrainian Interests in Int'l & Foreign Courts, 898 F. Supp. 2d 301 (D. Mass. 2012)
(holding that the Ukrainian government's act of hiring a private entity to recover
lost property was commercial, even when the lost property was sovereign assets).
113. Lantheus Med. Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 841 F.Supp.2d 769, 772
(S.D.N.Y 2012).
114. Id. at 771-72, 786.
115. Id. at 773.
116. Id. at 772-74, 784.
117. Id. at 789.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 788.
120. Id. at 789.
121. Id.
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found to be commercial activity under the FSIA. 122
Contracting for the Management of Health Benefit Plans-Commer-
cial. In Lasheen v. Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the estate of
an Egyptian scholar who had been studying in the United States sued
various Egyptian defendants, alleging violations of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) and breach of contract stemming
from the denial of health benefits relating to the plaintiff's liver trans-
plant.123 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision 124 that
the Egyptian defendants had engaged in fundamentally commercial activ-
ity when they contracted with a private company to manage the health
benefits plan in which the plaintiff participated. 125 The defendants did so
without using any power peculiar to a sovereign. 26
2. What Acts Create a Nexus with the United States?
Once a court has found that a foreign sovereign's act is "commercial"
under the FSIA, it must then determine whether the act has a sufficient
nexus with the United States to fall within the commercial activity excep-
tion.127 Courts can find this nexus in three possible circumstances: (1) the
foreign sovereign "carried on" the commercial act in the United States;
(2) the act took place in the United States in connection with commercial
activity abroad; or (3) the foreign sovereign acted outside of the United
States in connection with its commercial activity but still caused a "direct
effect" in the United States.' 28
a. Acts in the United States by Foreign States
The first clause of the commercial activity exception permits jurisdic-
tion over commercial acts "carried on in the United States" by foreign
states.129 The federal courts addressed this issue frequently in 2012, most
often concluding that the alleged acts did not sufficiently establish a
nexus with the United States to satisfy the exception.' 30
Execution of Contracts in United States-Insufficient. In Terenkian v.
Republic of Iraq, two Cyprus oil brokerage companies sued Iraq for its
unilateral termination of contracts for the purchase and sale of Iraqi
oil.131 Reversing the lower court's decision, the Ninth Circuit found that
Iraq's commercial activities were not "carried on in the United States"
122. Id.
123. Lasheen v. Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 485 F. App'x 203, 204 (9th
Cir. 2012).
124. See Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt v. Lasheen, 603 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th
Cir. 2010).
125. Lasheen, 485 F. App'x at 205.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., S.K. Innovation, Inc. v. Finpol, 854 F. Supp. 2d 99, 109-10 (D.D.C. 2012).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1137 (9th Cir. 2012).
131. Id. at 1125.
2014] FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: 2012 581
and thus did not establish the necessary nexus for jurisdiction to exist.' 32
Although the plaintiffs alleged that the contracts at issue were executed
at the Cyprus Mission in New York City, the Court held that this alone
was insufficient to satisfy the first clause, and to hold otherwise would be
too "formalistic.' 133 Here, the plaintiffs alleged no prior activity related
to the contracts occurring within the United States, nor did the contracts
specify that any performance was to occur in the United States.' 34 With-
out more, the mere signing of the contracts in the United States was not
enough. 135
Partial Ownership of Rail Group Contracting with U.S. Company-
Insufficient. In Sachs v. Republic of Austria, the plaintiff sued Austria
and its national railway based on injuries she suffered while attempting to
board a moving train in Austria. 136 Sachs argued that the Austrian de-
fendants "carried on" commercial activity in the United States through
their relationship with the Massachusetts-based company Rail Pass Ex-
perts, from which she purchased her "Eurail" ticket.137 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that this relationship was too attenuated.1 38 The Austrian de-
fendants did not have a direct relationship with the U.S. company.' 39
Rather, the Austrian national railway, along with thirty other European
national railways, jointly owned Eurail, 140 which, as a distinct legal entity,
marketed and sold its Eurail passes, including through Rail Pass Ex-
perts.1 41 Sachs was unable to show that the Austrian defendants under-
took "day-to-day, routine involvement" in the Eurail Group, let alone in
Rail Pass Experts, and thus could not show any commercial activity that
the defendants "carried on in the United States. 1 42
Performing Logistical Aspects of Contract in United States-Insuffi-
cient. In Triple A Intern., Inc. v. Democratic Republic of Congo, a Michi-
gan corporation brought suit against the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) to collect on a debt allegedly owed to the corporation by
the DRC's predecessor, Zaire. 143 In response to the DRC's motion to
dismiss, Triple A argued that the commercial activity exception applied
based on the DRC's "substantial contact" with the United States.144 The
court disagreed, noting that the FSIA's legislative history suggests "sub-
stantial contact" may establish a sufficient nexus with the United States,
but finding that the DRC's relevant contacts with the United States fell




136. Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 695 F.3d 1021, 1022 (9th Cir. 2012).
137. Id. at 1024.
138. Id. at 1026.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1022.
141. Id. at 1022-23.
142. Id. at 1025, 1033.
143. Triple A Int'l, Inc. v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 852 F. Supp. 2d 839, 840 (E.D. Mich.
2012).
144. Id. at 845.
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short of being "substantial." 14 5 Specifically, the court found that the par-
ties did not conduct any contract negotiations in the United States and
the contract required all payments to be made to a Zaire bank account in
Zaire currency.146 The court also found no evidence that the parties de-
liberately sought substantial contract performance related to the United
States.1 47 Rather, the court found that Triple A's performance of certain
tasks related to the contract from its Michigan office was "occasioned
simply by U.S. citizenship or U.S. residence of the plaintiff" and therefore
was insufficient for purposes of the commercial activity exception. 148
b. Acts in the United States in Connection with Commercial
Activity Abroad
The second clause of the commercial activity exception under section
1605(a)(2) provides for jurisdiction where the challenged acts take place
in the United States but relate to a sovereign's commercial activity
abroad.' 4 9 It is important to remember that this exception applies only if
the acts in the United States are "in connection with" the commercial
activity of the foreign state.150 And again, those acts must also form the
basis of the suit itself.
In 2012, the federal courts found few opportunities to directly address
this second clause of the commercial activity exception. One court that
did address the issue focused on the initial question of whether an act
actually occurs "in the United States"-an often overlooked but essential
inquiry.15' The Second Circuit, in Rogers v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., ad-
dressed claims brought by holders of Brazilian bonds for breach of con-
tract in connection with refusal by Petrobrs-a Brazilian state-owned
company-to convert plaintiffs' bonds into shares. 152 Importantly, the
plaintiffs became aware of Petrobrds' denial after receiving an e-mail
from a U.S.-based investor relations employee.' 53 The Second Circuit
concluded that the U.S.-originated e-mail was not the actual act upon
which the plaintiffs rested their breach of contract claim.' 54 The alleged
breach in fact occurred in Brazil when Brazil denied conversion of the
arguably expired bonds.' 55 The U.S. e-mail was merely notice of this de-
nial, not the denial itself.156 With no other "act performed in the United
States" supporting plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs could not establish a suffi-
145. Id. at 848.
146. id. at 846.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 845.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006).
150. Id.
151. Rogers v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 673 F.3d 131, 132 (2d Cir. 2012).
152. Id. at 133-35.
153. Id. at 134.
154. Id. at 138.
155. Id. at 137-38.
156. Id.
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cient nexus to overcome Brazil's immunity.157
c. Acts outside the United States that Cause a "Direct Effect" in
the United States
The third clause of the commercial activity exception under section
1605(a)(2) grants U.S. courts jurisdiction over acts that occur outside the
United States, but which cause a "direct effect" in the United States. 158
This third category is a repeated subject of litigation because of the un-
certainty behind what constitutes a "direct" versus an "indirect" effect. 159
Courts will often consider whether the act at issue necessarily caused an
effect in the United States. 160 As the examples below illustrate, courts
are more likely to find a "direct effect" in contract disputes where the
contract references some kind of performance specifically related to the
United States.
Non-Deposit of Payments and Non-Sales in United States-No Direct
Effect. Again in Terenkian, the Cyprus brokerages argued that Iraq's ter-
mination of its contracts had a direct effect in the United States because it
prevented the sale of oil to potential U.S. customers and the deposit of oil
payments into a New York bank.' 6 1 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, finding that the non-payment and non-sales were merely indirect
effects.' 62 For instance, no evidence existed that, but for the contracts'
cancellation, the payments would have been made to New York banks or
that the oil would have been sold to U.S. customers. 163 Iraq had no con-
tractual obligation to deliver oil to the United States, and the brokerages
had no contractual obligations to U.S. buyers. 164 Moreover, these tan-
gential consequences did not give rise to the plaintiffs' claims and thus
were "too remote and attenuated to qualify as a direct effect" in the
United States for FSIA purposes.' 65
Investing in "Feeder Funds" of U.S. Securities Company-Direct Ef-
fect. In Securities Investor Protection Corporation v. Bernard L. Madoff
Investment Securities LLC-previously discussed as an example of com-
mercial activity-the Southern District of New York also held that the
investment of Taiwan's Bureau of Labor Insurance (BLI) in "feeder
funds" affiliated with Madoff's investment company had a "direct effect"
157. Id. at 138.
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006).
159. See, e.g., Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).
160. See, e.g., id. at 1139.
161. Id. at 1138.
162. Id. at 1138-39.
163. See id.; see also Rogers v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 673 F.3d 131, 138-40 (2d Cir.
2012) (holding that the refusal to honor allegedly expired Brazilian bonds owned
by U.S. citizens did not have a direct effect in the United States, where nothing in
the bonds required payment in the United States, nor contemplated the reasonably
likelihood that payment could occur in the United States).
164. Terenkian, 694 F.3d at 1138-39.
165. Id. at 1139 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
584 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 20
in the United States. 166 Specifically, Taiwan's transfer of funds into the
United States, and then eventual transfer-with Taiwan's profits-from
the United States back abroad constituted a direct effect sufficient to trig-
ger the commercial activity exception. 167 The court found that the U.S.
connection to the transfer process was not merely incidental, but was part
of the investment's "ultimate objective."'1 68
Selling Medical Isotopes to the United States-Direct Effect. In
Lantheus Medical Imaging, after determining that the operation of a nu-
clear reactor and subsequent sale of medical isotopes by Atomic Energy
of Canada Limited (AECL) was a commercial activity as discussed
above, the court held that AECL's conduct had a "direct effect" in the
United States. 169 It did not matter that a third party refined AECL's
medical isotopes before their sale to Lantheus in the United States, be-
cause that third party played no role in the detrimental, direct effects that
AECL's operation and shutdown of its reactor had on Lantheus' fi-
nances. 170 In other words, Lantheus' financial losses did not "depend
crucially" on the conduct of the third-party refiner-only on that of
AECL.171
Selling Counterfeit Products Overseas-No Direct Effect. Last year,
we discussed the district court's decision in Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran,172 in which the court entered a default judg-
ment against Iran because Iran's actions had a "direct effect" in the
United States. In 2012, the court considered Iran's motion to vacate the
2011 default judgment, and specifically whether Iran's alleged manufac-
ture of low quality helicopters that copied the trade dress of the plaintiff's
higher quality helicopters had a direct effect in the United States.' 73 This
time, the court concluded that there was not a direct effect.174 The court
noted that the testimony before it established only the "potential" for
confusion between the two manufacturers' helicopters1 75 The manufac-
turers also tended to sell to different markets: the market for plaintiff's
products had more discerning buyers and certification standards (such as
those in the United States), while Iran's market had more cost-conscious
buyers willing to accept products that did not meet those certifications. 176
And even if a U.S. buyer contemplated purchasing Iranian-made helicop-
166. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 480 B.R. 501, 513
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
167. Id. at 513-14.
168. Id. at 513.
169. Lantheus Med. Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 841 F.Supp.2d 769, 790-91
(S.D.N.Y 2012).
170. Id. at 790.
171. Id.
172. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 764 F. Supp. 2d 122, 126
(D.D.C. 2011), vacated, 892 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D.D.C. 2012).
173. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 892 F. Supp. 2d 219,
221-22 (D.D.C. 2012), afj'd, 734 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
174. Id. at 234.
175. Id. at 232.
176. Id.
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ter parts over those made by the plaintiff, such an effect would be "neces-
sarily dependent on a series of intervening acts by others"-i.e., not a
direct effect.' 77
C. TAKINGS-§ 1605(a)(3)
Section 1605(a)(3) of the FSIA provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case ... in which rights in
property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any
property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or in-
strumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
States.178
In 2012, the courts addressed only a limited number of cases under sec-
tion 1605(a)(3)'s takings exception to the FSIA. 179 Those cases, however,
raised a number of substantive issues.
Takings can be of intangible property. In Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti
Bank, Holocaust survivors and the descendants of Holocaust victims
brought suit against Hungarian banks and the Hungarian national rail-
way, alleging that the defendants had expropriated plaintiffs' property
some sixty-five years before. 180 In their defense, the Hungarian banks
argued that the FSIA takings exception did not apply to takings of intan-
gible property, such as bank assets.' 8 1 The Seventh Circuit disagreed,
concluding that the statutory language behind the takings exception in no
way supported the distinction between tangible and intangible property
and thus allowed the taking of intangible property to trigger an exception
to immunity. 182
Exhaustion of domestic remedies is generally necessary to assert a tak-
ing in violation of international law. Also in Abelesz, the defendants
argued that the plaintiffs could not rely upon the takings exception be-
cause they had not yet exhausted Hungary's domestic remedies. 183 This
time the Seventh Circuit agreed.' 84 Although noting that the FSIA's lan-
guage did not explicitly require plaintiffs to exhaust domestic remedies,
the court found that customary international law required that each state
should have the opportunity to redress its alleged wrongs through its own
177. Id. at 233.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006).
179. See, e.g., Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2012); Best Med.
BeIg., Inc. v. Kingdom of Belg., 913 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D. Va. 2012).
180. Abelesz, 692 F.3d at 665.
181. Id. at 671-72.
182. Id. at 673.
183. Id. at 678.
184. See id. at 684.
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means, and that a U.S. court should afford that opportunity before inter-
ceding. 185 That the plaintiffs were seeking damages amounting to 40 per-
cent of Hungary's gross domestic product was all the more reason for the
United States to delay its consideration of the matter.
186
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that legally compelling reasons
could exist for plaintiffs' failure to exhaust, but the plaintiffs were unable
to meet this burden on the facts of the case. Specifically, the court found
insufficient plaintiffs' stated concerns about pursuing their claims in a
country suffering from resurgent anti-Semitism and an economic depres-
sion, and that remedies available in Hungary were not congruent with
those available in the United States.187
Sale of assets pursuant to judgment by a foreign court is not a taking
of property. In Best Medical Belgium, Inc. v. Kingdom of Belgium, dis-
cussed above, the U.S. corporation and its Belgian subsidiary asserted
claims against Belgium and certain Belgian judicial figures for their role
in the sale of the subsidiary's assets pursuant to a Belgian court proceed-
ing similar to that of bankruptcy in the United States. 188 The district
court determined that the asset sale occurred only after the Belgian
courts determined that the subsidiary owed significant debt, which the
plaintiffs did not dispute18 9 Thus, the judicial administration and sale of
the struggling company's assets was not a "taking" of property sufficient
to confer jurisdiction.' 90
"Domestic takings" do not violate international law, or do they? The
Best Medical Belgium defendants also argued that the takings exception
did not apply because, under the FSIA, a "domestic taking"-i.e., the
"[e]xpropriation by a foreign government of the property of its nation-
als"-is not a recognized violation of international law, and therefore
does not support jurisdiction.' 9 The district court agreed, finding that,
even if Belgium's actions could be deemed a "taking," because its own
citizens were involved, the exception did not apply.'9 2 The Seventh Cir-
cuit in Abelesz also considered this argument but reached the opposite
conclusion, finding that the alleged expropriation was incident to acts of
genocide.' 93 Because the takings in that case constituted conduct univer-
sally condemned under international law, the court found that the de-
fendants could not rely on the "domestic takings" principle to escape
jurisdiction.' 9 4
185. Id. at 680-82.
186. Id. at 682.
187. Id. at 684-85.
188. Best Med. BeIg., Inc. v. Kingdom of Belg., 913 F. Supp. 2d 230, 234-35 (E.D. Va.
2012).
189. Id. at 239-40.
190. Id. at 239.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 239-40.
193. Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 675-77 (7th Cir. 2012).
194. Id. at 677.
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D. NON-COMMERCIAL ToRTs-§ 1605(a)(5)
The "non-commercial tort" or "tortious activity" exception subjects a
sovereign defendant to jurisdiction in the United States for claims based
on actions:
[I]n which money damages are sought against a foreign state for per-
sonal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while
acting within the scope of his office or employment .... 195
When determining whether an alleged action constitutes a tort, courts
generally apply the substantive law of the state in which the act took
place.' 96
The Act provides two circumstances where a state actor may retain its
immunity even though the exception might otherwise apply. First, the
exception does not apply where the claim is based on the exercise or per-
formance (or failure to perform) of a "discretionary function. 1 97 Sec-
ond, the exception does not apply to claims arising out of malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contractual rights. 198
In 2012, the Second Circuit analyzed when the exercise of a "discre-
tionary function" is sufficient to avoid application of the tortious activity
exception. 199 In addition, certain cases discussed elsewhere in this review
were dismissed under the non-commercial tort exception because the tort
did not occur in or entirely in the United States.20 0
In USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Permanent Mission of Republic of Namibia,
the Second Circuit held that the Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Namibia (Mission), an instrumentality of the Republic, was not immune
from a tort suit arising out of its alleged failure to comply with the New
York City Building Code.20 The case arose out of the collapse of a
shared wall between the plaintiff's property and the Mission.20 2 Applying
New York law, the Second Circuit first determined that the failure to
"shore up" the shared wall between the Mission's property and the ad-
joining townhouse was a violation of the non-delegable obligation under
the New York Building Code that the persons "causing" construction
"[m]aintain the structural integrity of [common walls]. '20 3 Next, the
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006).
196. See, e.g., USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Permanent Mission of Republic of Namib., 681
F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2012).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A).
198. Id. § 1605(a)(5)(B).
199. Permanent Mission of Republic of Namib., 681 F.3d at 111-12.
200. See Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 684 (7th Cir. 2012); Gomes v.
ANGOP, Angl. Press Agency, No. 11-CV-0580, 2012 WL 3637453, at *55-56
(E.D.N.Y Aug. 22, 2012).
201. Permanent Mission of Republic of Namib., 681 F.3d at 113.
202. Id. at 105.
203. Id. at 109 (quoting N.Y.C. § BC 3309.8).
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Court considered whether the violation took place in the context of the
Mission's "exercise [of] a discretionary function"-namely, the Mission's
decision to locate its chancery in the building.20 4 Noting that the discre-
tionary function exception is available only if (1) the acts alleged to be
negligent involve an "element of judgment or choice and are not com-
pelled by statute or regulation;" and (2) the "judgment or choice in ques-
tion must be grounded in considerations of public policy or susceptible to
policy analysis," the court found that the Mission's actions did not qualify
as a discretionary function for two reasons.20 5 First, the Mission's obliga-
tion to maintain the integrity of the common wall was "specifically com-
pelled by regulation and was nondelegable. ' 20 6 And second, there was
no policy consideration implicated in the Mission's failure to protect the
wall. 20 7 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Court determined that
a "discretionary" act "must [itself] involve the exercise of policy judg-
ment," and that the failure of the Mission to ensure the structural integ-
rity of the common wall during construction is "simply not a judgment
... of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield. 20 8
E. ARBITRATION-§ 1605(a)(6)
U.S. courts have jurisdiction under the FSIA to enforce an agreement
by a foreign state to arbitrate, or to confirm an arbitration award against
a foreign state, in three circumstances: (1) where the arbitration took
place or is intended to take place in the United States; or (2) where the
agreement or award is governed by a treaty or other international agree-
ment calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards; or
(3) where, but for the agreement to arbitrate, the underlying claim could
have been brought in a U.S. court under the FSIA.2 0 9 Cases are most
frequently brought under the second option, but plaintiffs' failure to sat-
isfy other jurisdictional requirements (statutory or constitutional) can
prove fatal to their claims.
In 2012, courts continued to hold that arbitral awards made pursuant to
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (the "New York Convention") and the International Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (the "ICSID Convention")
were precisely the types of awards section 1605(a)(6) was intended to
cover.
210
204. Id. at 112-13.
205. Id. at 113.
206. Id. at 112.
207. Permanent Mission of Republic of Namib., 681 F.3d at 113.
208. Id. (internal citations omitted).
209. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2006).
210. See, e.g., Concesionaria Dominicana de Autopistas y Carreteras, S.A. v. Domini-
can State, No. 12-CV-1335, 2012 WL 6632812, at *10-11 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2012);
Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, 893 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751 (E.D. Va. 2012).
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Also in 2012, the Fifth Circuit addressed in two cases whether, under
traditional veil-piercing/agency principles, the arbitration exception can
confer jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign that was not a party to an
arbitration agreement but allegedly controlled (or was the alter ego of) a
signatory party. 211
In First Inv. Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuild-
ing, Ltd. of People's Republic of China212 and In re Arbitration Act of
1996,213 the plaintiffs attempted to enforce arbitration awards against the
People's Republic of China (PRC) despite the fact that they were not
party to any arbitration agreement or named in any award. In First Inv.
Corp., the plaintiffs argued that the PRC should be bound by an arbitra-
tion agreement because Fujian Mawei-a private company 100% owned
by the PRC and a party to the arbitration agreement-was the PRC's
alter ego.2 14 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, upholding the
lower court's determination that mere ownership was insufficient to es-
tablish the "necessary degree of control" and accordingly dismissed the
case against the PRC.215 Similarly, in In re Arbitration Act of 1996, the
plaintiffs argued that the PRC exerted "so much control over [the defen-
dant] Xiamen, that they are not legally separate entities[.] ' '2 16 Again, the
Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and dismissed PRC from the case,
finding that plaintiffs had not demonstrated the high level of control nec-
essary for the court to "find an agency relationship and enforce an arbi-
tration award against a principal. '217
In a slightly different twist, in Blue Ridge Investments LLC v. Republic
of Argentina, Argentina sought dismissal of a claim by Blue Ridge to en-
force an ICSID award against it that Blue Ridge had purchased from a
third party, on the grounds that Blue Ridge was not an original party to
the underlying arbitration agreement, but an "assignee," and therefore
lacked standing to enforce the award. 2 18 Rejecting Argentina's argu-
ment, the New York District Court held that Argentina waived its immu-
nity under the arbitration exception by (1) joining the ICSID Convention;
and (2) entering into an agreement with the assigning party to submit its
dispute to arbitration. 21 9 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's finding that Argentina had waived its sovereign immunity
pursuant to both the waiver exception and the exception for the enforce-
211. See In re Arbitration Act of 1996, No. 09-7041, 2012 WL 669240 (E.D. La. Feb. 29,
2012), aff'd, Covington Marine Corp. v. Xiamen Shipbuilding Indus., 504 F. App'x
298 (5th Cir. 2012); First Inv. Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Ship-
building, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2012).
212. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, 703 F.3d 742.
213. In re Arbitration Act of 1996, 2012 WL 669240.
214. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, 703 F.3d at 756.
215. Id. at 755-56.
216. In re Arbitration Act of 1996, 2012 WL 669240, at *8.
217. Id.
218. Blue Ridge Invs., LLC v. Republic of Arg., 902 F. Supp. 2d 367, 375 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
2012), affd in part, 735 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013).
219. Id. at 375.
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ment of arbitral awards.22 0
F. TERRORISM-§ 1605A AND § 1605(a)(7)
In 2012, courts continued to address the amendments to the "terrorism
exception" to the FSIA, which were enacted in 2008 as part of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA).221 The
amendments replaced section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA with the new "ter-
rorism exception," codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A.222 Under both section
1605(a)(7) and section 1605A, foreign states designated by the U.S. De-
partment of State as sponsors of terrorism (and their agencies and instru-
mentalities) are stripped of sovereign immunity for certain terrorist acts
for as long as the state is designated a "state sponsor of terrorism. '223
The states lose immunity if they were a "state sponsor of terrorism" ei-
ther at the time of the terrorist act or are so designated at a later time as a
result of the act that is the subject of the suit.224 For foreign sovereigns'
conduct to fall within this exception (in addition to being designated a
"state sponsor of terrorism"), they must have participated in an "act of
torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking" or pro-
vided "material support or resources for such an act."' 225 Plaintiffs must
also prove causation and damages.226 Among the most significant recent
changes to the "terrorism exception," the statute now expressly: (1) pro-
vides plaintiffs with a federal statutory cause of action against state spon-
sors of terrorism, and (2) allows plaintiffs to seek punitive damages
directly against the foreign state.227
1. Implementation of § 1605A
Mechanics. Courts generally agree that the NDAA's expansive provi-
sions are applicable to cases "related" to those filed under section
1605(a)(7) only if they were "before the courts in any form on its date of
enactment, ' 22 8 and most have rejected the argument that where final
judgments stand unsatisfied, the underlying claims remain "before the
220. Blue Ridge lnvs., LLC v. Republic of Arg., 735 F.3d 72, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2013).
221. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,122
Stat. 3.
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008).
223. Id. Currently, the list of "state sponsors of terrorism" consists of Cuba, Iran, Su-
dan, and Syria. State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. Diir'Tr STr., http://www.state.gov/
j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). Countries that were once on the
list but have since been removed include Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, South
Yemen, and Libya. Molly McCluskey, The United States' 'Outdated' Terror List,






228. See, e.g., Hegna v. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 908 F. Supp. 2d 116,
116-18, 123 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083(c)(2)(A)(iv), 122 Stat. 3, 342); see also
Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 567 F. Supp. 2d 141, 142 (D.D.C. 2008).
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courts" for the purposes of the NDAA. 229 But some courts have held
that the NDAA provides plaintiffs an additional "avenue of relief under
section 1605A based on the same prior act or incident. '230
State Law Causes of Action. With regard to U.S. citizen plaintiffs who
seek to bring claims simultaneously under section 1605A and state law,
courts have dismissed the state law claims, finding that allowing such
causes of action to proceed would "nullify Congress' expressed purpose"
to avoid inconsistent judgments due to the variations in state laws and
would "largely undermine the sea-change effected by the enactment" of
the NDAA.231 As discussed below, this line of reasoning has not been
extended to claims by foreign nationals.
Evidentiary Burden. In properly filed related actions, courts in 2012
continued to rely upon evidence presented in earlier cases-without re-
quiring the parties to reproduce such evidence-to reach their own, inde-
pendent findings of fact as to liability.23 2 In Fain v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, the district court found Iran responsible for the 1983 attacks on the
Marine barracks in Lebanon, but relied on evidence presented in prior
actions involving the same incident instead of requiring plaintiffs to re-
establish Iran's liability. 233 Likewise, in Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of
Iran-filed after plaintiffs received a judgment in a section 1605(a)(7)
case-the court took judicial notice of its previous findings to establish
that the District of Columbia's intentional infliction of emotional distress
standard was satisfied.2 34
In cases involving acts of torture, such as Han Kim v. Democratic Peo-
ple's Republic of Korea, courts in 2012 continue to require plaintiffs to
provide "useful details about the torture" suffered and "its severity" that
strictly satisfies the "[Torture Victim's Protection Act's] rigorous defini-
tion of torture. 235
229. See Hegna, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 122-23 (citing Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
545 F. Supp. 2d 120, 121-22 (D.D.C. 2008) ("Plaintiffs' suggestion-that this case
is currently pending because of the open-ended possibility of filing an attachment
or executing the judgment in the future-is inconsistent with the statutory lan-
guage that requires the case to be before the Court as of January 28, 2008."));
Bodoff, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 142; accord Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 567 F.
Supp. 2d 143, 144 (D.D.C. 2008); Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 567 F. Supp. 2d
146, 147 (D.D.C. 2008)).
230. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 63-65
(D.D.C. 2009); see also Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 907 F. Supp. 2d 93, 100
(D.D.C. 2012).
231. See Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 845 F. Supp. 2d 204, 215 (D.D.C. 2012)
(quoting Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 08-CV-1807, 2010 WL 5105174, at
*9 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2010)).
232. See, e.g., Fain v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 856 F. Supp. 2d 109, 115-16 (D.D.C.
2012); Bodoff, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 96-97.
233. See Fain, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 114-16 (citing Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700
F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2010)) (relying on evidence presented in Peterson v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2003)).
234. Bodoff, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
235. Han Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, No. CIV. A. 09-648 RWR,
2012 WL 3696385, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2012).
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Causation. In Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, the court followed pre-
cedent in holding that to establish jurisdiction under § 1605A, plaintiffs:
Need not establish that the material support or resources provided
by Syria for terrorist acts contributed directly to the hostage-tak-
ing... Rather, the plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to establish a
reasonable connection between a country's provision of material
support to a terrorist organization and the damages arising out of a
terrorist attack.236
2. Claims by Foreign Nationals
One of the most significant features of § 1605A is its expansion of the
"terrorism exception" to provide a cause of action to certain victims and
family members who are foreign nationals. This new federal cause of ac-
tion is available to: (1) U.S. nationals, (2) members of the U.S. armed
forces, (3) U.S. government employees, even if not U.S. nationals, and (4)
legal representatives of the individuals in the first three categories. 237 In
2012, courts continued to permit the claims of those victims' foreign na-
tional family members to proceed, finding that, although § 1605A's plain
language limits the federal cause of action to its four stated categories, it
continues to operate as a pass-through (or waiver of sovereign immunity)
for foreign national family members to state claims under applicable state
or foreign law. 238
3. Choice of Law Issues
One of Congress' motivations for creating this federal cause of action
was to eliminate the disparate outcomes that had resulted from the appli-
cation of varying substantive law to plaintiffs in the same case based on
their domiciles at the time of the incident. 239 Nonetheless, in certain cir-
cumstances, courts still must navigate through difficult choice of law prin-
ciples in applying the terrorism exception.
1. Claims of Foreign National Family Members Under § 1605A.
Because § 1605A's federal cause of action is available only to catego-
ries of individuals explicitly identified therein, courts must determine
which state or foreign law applies to the claims of foreign national family
members of victims of terrorism. 240 In furtherance of the NDAA's pur-
pose of promoting uniformity, courts conducting this choice-of-law analy-
236. Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216, 228 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal
alterations and quotations omitted).
237. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c).
238. Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 570-71 (7th Cir. 2012) (hold-
ing that "Congress has established a private right of action principally for Ameri-
can claimants, while waiving sovereign immunity in a broader set of cases also
involving American victims.").
239. See, e.g., Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 568; Hegna v. Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps, 908 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121 (D.D.C. 2012).
240. Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 567-68.
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sis have typically applied the law of the forum-typically the District of
Columbia-to all such claims where the attacks directly targeted U.S. fa-
cilities and U.S. nationals working abroad. 241 But where an attack does
not directly target U.S. interests, the claims of foreign national family
members must be adjudicated under the law of the jurisdiction where the
injury took place.2 42
2. 1605(a)(7) Claims.
Despite the passage of § 1605A in 2008, courts in 2012 still found it
necessary to address choice of law issues in §1605(a)(7) cases, which con-
tinue to yield "inconsistent results. '243 In Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Re-
public of Iran,244 the district court had previously held that Israeli law
applied to the claims of a U.S. national who was murdered in 1997 by a
suicide bomber at a pedestrian mall in Jerusalem, as well as to the claims
of the victim's foreign national family members.245 The court reasoned
that the victim was domiciled in Israel and that there was no evidence the
attack, which was intended to disrupt Israeli-Palestinian peace negotia-
tions, was targeted at U.S. citizens or interests.246 In 2012, upon the
plaintiffs' fifth motion for default judgment, the court found that plain-
tiffs had established liability under Israeli law and that the estate of the
U.S. national victim was entitled to compensatory damages under Israeli
law.247 But the court then found that there was insufficient evidence that
the victim's family members were entitled to compensatory damages be-
cause "Israeli law lacks a legal mechanism by which plaintiffs could ob-
tain compensation for their emotional or non-economic injuries. '2 48
241. See Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F. Supp. 2d 128, 153-56 (D.D.C. 2011) (Su-
danese- and Iranian-sponsored attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
in 1998); Estate of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20-23
(D.D.C. 2011) (Iranian-sponsored attacks on U.S. embassy in Lebanon in 1983 and
1984).
242. Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 569 (vacating and remanding lower court judgment for re-
consideration of claims under Israeli law in case brought by foreign national family
members arising out of terrorist attack on a highway in Israel, during which a U.S.
citizen child was injured).
243. Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 873 F. Supp. 2d 232, 246 (D.D.C.
2012) ("Today's decision is another sad example of the inconsistent results arising
from this defunct regime: the family members of Yael Botvin receive no solatium
compensation while family members of victims in the earlier Compuzano decision
received millions of dollars in solatium compensation.") (citing Campuzano v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 276 (D.D.C. 2003).
244. Estate of Botvin, 873 F. Supp. 2d 232, 235 (D.D.C. 2012).
245. Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 772 F. Supp. 2d 218, 225-26 (D.D.C.
2011).
246. Id.
247. Estate of Botvin, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 235, 243-44 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that Israeli
Civil Wrongs Ordinance § 78 is similar to a wrongful death action in the United
States and awarding $1,704,457 in compensatory economic damages).
248. Id. at 245.
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4. Damages
1. Economic Damages.
Reasonably foreseeable damages have been awarded under the terror-
ism exception for economic loss, such as loss of earning capacity and
property. 249 In 2012, courts continued to rely on expert testimony250 to
award economic damages for the loss of earning capacity for injured vic-
tims and for the loss of accretions to the estate that would have been
expected had there not been a wrongful death. 251 But in Wyatt v. Syrian
Arab Republic, the court refused to award: (1) damages for a lost busi-
ness opportunity because the allegations were "too speculative to credit;"
(2) medical costs because plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of specific
costs that were incurred; and (3) travel expenses because plaintiffs failed
to offer any evidence to support this claim.252 Similarly, in Oveissi v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, the court refused to "engage in the speculative
venture plaintiff seeks" to award damages to the grandson of an assassi-
nated former Iranian general for loss of inheritance. 253 The reason for
the property loss was the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the general's sub-
sequent flight from Iran, not the general's assassination in Paris in
1984.254 The inheritance loss was not a "reasonably foreseeable" result of
the assassination because the general had lost possession or control over
the property at issue due to his exile from Iran, and there was no guaran-
tee that the grandson would have inherited any property had the general
lived. 255
2. Victims' Pain and Suffering.
Survivors of terrorist attacks have been deemed entitled to "baseline"
awards of $5 million in compensatory damages for substantial injuries. 256
Courts have departed upward to award higher damages in cases of more
severe, permanent physical and psychological injuries,2 57 and downward
249. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(d).
250. Section 1605A specifically provides for the use of Special Masters to determine
damages in terrorism-related activities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(e)(1).
251. See, e.g., Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 907 F. Supp. 2d 93, 97-98 (D.D.C.
2012); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 03 MDL 1570 GBD FM,
2012 WL 4711407, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012); Fain III v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 885 F. Supp. 2d 78, 82 (D.D.C. 2012); Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864
F. Supp. 2d 24, 39 (D.D.C. 2012); Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 845 F. Supp. 2d
204, 214 (D.D.C. 2012).
252. Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216, 230 (D.D.C. 2012).
253. Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 58 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying
damages sought under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(d)).
254. Id. at 57-58.
255. Id. at 58.
256. See Fain III v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 885 F. Supp. 2d 78, 81 (D.D.C. 2012);
Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 (D.D.C. 2012); Wyatt v.
Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216, 231-32 (D.D.C. 2012) (awarding $5
million in pain and suffering to hostage victims of terrorists).
257. Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 (D.D.C. 2012) (awarding
$8 million where victim had "conscious suffering for nearly one month" from phys-
ical injuries of "exceptional severity").
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to as low as $1.5 million where the injuries are minor or purely emo-
tional.258 In hostage cases, some courts have calculated damages on a per
diem basis; but in Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, where the per diem
amount was "inadequate to compensate plaintiffs for their injuries," the
court awarded the baseline $5 million to each victim.2 59
3. Solatium.
In assessing loss of solatium awards for victims' family members, courts
have analyzed the following factors: (1) whether the victim died in the
attack; (2) "the nature of the relationship between the claimant and the
victim;" and (3) "the severity and duration of the pain suffered by the
family member. '260 Courts have generally ordered baseline awards of $8
million to spouses of deceased victims, $5 million to the decedent's par-
ents, $3 million to children, and $2.5 million to siblings. 26 1 Those
amounts are generally reduced by half for family members of the victims
who were injured, not killed.2 62 Where a plaintiff is related to multiple
victims, courts "establish the family member's baseline at the higher of
the figures and then consider whether to grant an upward departure from
that higher baseline. '263 Absent special circumstances, "it is inappropri-
ate for the solatium awards of family members to exceed the pain and
suffering awards of the surviving servicemen. '264 In such cases, courts
have reduced family members' awards in rough proportion to the base-
line framework. 26 5
Plaintiffs must have been immediate family members of the victims at
258. Davis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 882 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12-13 (D.D.C. 2012) (award-
ing $2 million for minor physical but severe emotional injuries); Harrison v. Re-
public of Sudan, 882 F. Supp. 2d 23, 49 (D.D.C. 2012) (awarding $1.5 million where
victims sustained no physical harm).
259. Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216, 231-32 (D.D.C. 2012).
260. Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 768 F. Supp. 2d 16, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2011). That
solatium award was upheld in Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d
44, 55 (D.D.C. 2012).
261. E.g., Fain III v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 885 F. Supp. 2d 78, 82 (D.D.C. 2012)
(citing Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 299 (D.D.C.
2006)); Estate of Brown v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 872 F. Supp. 2d 37, 42 (D.D.C.
2012).
262. Estate of Brown v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 872 F. Supp. 2d 37, 42 (D.D.C. 2012).
But see Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216 (D.D.C. 2012) (award-
ing $4 million each to victims' spouses and $2.5 million each to victims' children
where one victim was still alive and another had died of causes unrelated to the
attack). The higher award in Wyatt appears to be based on a misapplication of the
framework set out in Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d
299, 271-359 (D.D.C. 2006).
263. Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 40 (D.D.C. 2012).
264. Estate of Brown, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (D.D.C. 2012).
265. Estate of Brown, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 42-44 (D.D.C. 2012) (modifying proposed
awards in proportion with servicemen's awards and Heiser framework, but with
consideration of special circumstances warranting higher awards); O'Brien v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, 853 F. Supp. 2d 44, 47-48 (D.D.C. 2012) (awarding in
"rough proportionality" $850,000 and $500,000 respectively to parents and siblings
of injured servicemen who received $1.5 million in pain and suffering); see gener-
ally Bland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 831 F. Supp. 2d 150, 157-58 (D.D.C. 2011).
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the time of the attack to receive awards for loss of solatium. 266 Indeed, in
Davis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the court considered several claims of
victims' children born after the attack and held that "a plaintiff bringing
an action under § 1605A must have been alive at the time of the attack in
order to collect solatium damages. '267 But courts have applied the $5
million baseline for relatives other than children who were in de facto
parent-child relationships with the victim. 2 68
Decisions to depart upward from these baselines are rooted in common
sense and may be warranted when plaintiffs present support such as: (1)
evidence establishing "an especially close relationship between the plain-
tiff and decedent," (2) "medical proof of severe pain, grief or suffering on
behalf of the claimant," or (3) evidence that "circumstances surrounding
the terrorist attack [rendered] the suffering particularly more acute or
agonizing. '269 In In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, given the
"extraordinarily tragic circumstances surrounding the September 11th at-
tacks" and "their indelible impact on the lives of the victims' families,"
the court granted a collective upward departure, awarding $12.5 million,
$8.5 million, $8.5 million, and $4.25 million for spouses, parents, children,
and siblings of deceased victims, respectively. 270 Other upward depar-
tures were awarded where a plaintiff was himself the victim of the attack
and also witnessed the slow death of his son,27 1 and where another plain-
tiff suffered a nervous breakdown after her brother's death.27 2
On the other end of the spectrum, courts will also award downward
departures from the baseline where circumstances warrant. For example,
an award was lowered in a case involving an estranged mother who had
not seen her son in 16 years. 273 And, in certain circumstances, the court
may even deny an award of solatium, as it did for an estranged brother
who had only "speculative information" about the attack and was unable
to recall whether he felt any emotional distress afterwards. 274
266. See, e.g., Estate of Brown, 872 F .Supp. 2d at 44, 55 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing
solatium claims of victim's child born two months after the attack and of victim's
half-siblings who "did not have a close relationship with him-a prerequisite to a
solatium award"); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 03 MDL
1570 GBD FM, 2012 WL 4711407, at *2, n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012) (dismissing
solatium claim of victim's niece who "does not serve functionally as an immediate
family member" of the victim).
267. Davis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 882 F. Supp. 2d 7, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2012).
268. See, e.g., Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 768 F. Supp. 2d 16, 27 (D.D.C. 2011)
(finding parent-child relationship between plaintiff and victim-grandfather). The
solatium award was upheld in Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d
44, 55 (D.D.C. 2012).
269. Estate of Brown v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 872 F. Supp. 2d 37, 42-43 (D.D.C.
2012).
270. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 03 MDL 1570 GBD FM, 2012
WL 4711407, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012).
271. Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 40 (D.D.C. 2012).
272. Estate of Brown, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 43-44 (D.D.C. 2012).
273. Estate of Brown, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 44 (D.D.C. 2012).
274. O'Brien v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 853 F. Supp. 2d 44, 48 (D.D.C. 2012).
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4. Punitive Damages.
Unlike § 1605(a)(7), § 1605A explicitly allows for punitive damages
awards against foreign sovereigns. 275 Some plaintiffs have brought ac-
tions for punitive damages after they have already obtained judgments
for compensatory damages under § 1605(a)(7)-with varying success2 76
Courts have recognized that the statutory language of § 1605A "can rea-
sonably be read to authorize only suits related to pending cases or, more
broadly, to authorize any suit related to an earlier action brought under
§1605(a)(7), or the Flatow Amendment, regardless of whether that first
suit was pending when the second suit was brought. '27 7 In Hegna v. Is-
lamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the court dismissed a second action
brought under § 1605A, reasoning that, if the statute authorized "a sec-
ond suit for damages based on the same nucleus of facts at the core of the
final judgment in an earlier suit," such an authorization "would raise a
serious [constitutional] question as to whether it violated the Article III
prohibition on the legislative revision of final judicial judgments. '2 7 8 But
in Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the court had awarded compensa-
tory and punitive damages to plaintiffs in 2006, but still heard an action
for punitive damages, which was brought within 60 days of passage of the
§ 1605A.279 The court confirmed its prior damages awards under
§ 1605A and held the Republic of Iran (the defendant in the prior suit)
and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (the new defendant
in the second suit) jointly and severally liable.28 0
In determining the amount of punitive damages, courts consider four
factors: "(1) the character of the defendants' act, (2) the nature and ex-
tent of harm to the plaintiffs that the defendants caused or intended to
cause, (3) the need for deterrence, and (4) the wealth of the defend-
ants. '2 8 1 In applying these factors, many courts have awarded approxi-
mately three times the compensatory damages in punitive damages;
although the cases arising out of the bombing of U.S. barracks in Beirut
use a 3.44 ratio as the standard.282 Other courts have awarded $300 mil-
275. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(e)(1).
276. See, e.g., Hegna v. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 908 F. Supp. 2d 116
(D.D.C. 2012); Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 907 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D.D.C.
2012).
277. Hegna, 908 F. Supp. 2d 116, 135 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that the "related action"
provision is limited to cases that have not yet been fully decided before an Article
III tribunal).
278. Hegna, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 118, 135 (D.D.C. 2012).
279. Bodoff, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 96, 107 (D.D.C. 2012).
280. See id. at 105.
281. Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 56 (D.D.C. 2012); Wyatt v.
Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216, 232 (D.D.C. 2012).
282. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 03 MDL 1570 GBD FM, 2012
WL 4711407, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting a 3.44 ratio of compensatory damages to
punitive damages is "the standard ratio applicable to a number of cases arising out
of terrorist attacks"); Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 882 F. Supp. 2d 23, 50-51
(D.D.C. 2012) (awarding "three times the compensatory damages in punitive dam-
ages" while noting that the ratio "has ranged between three and, in exceptional
cases, five"); Fain III v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 885 F. Supp. 2d 78, 83 (D.D.C.
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lion in punitive damages after weighing heavily the amount of a state's
estimated annual funds that are used to support terrorism and the de-
pravity of the state's acts.28 3
In both Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran and Oveissi v. Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, courts awarded $300 million in punitive damages, but then
considered whether such awards comport with recent Supreme Court gui-
dance on punitive damages.284 In both cases, the courts agreed with the
holding in Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran:285 "foreign sovereigns cannot
use the constitutional constraints of the Fifth Amendment due process
clause to shield themselves from large punitive damages awards, and so
the longstanding method for the calculation of punitive damages in FSIA
terrorism cases remains viable. 286
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS AGAINST
FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
Even if a plaintiff overcomes a foreign state's immunity and obtains a
judgment against the foreign sovereign, the plaintiff may find it difficult
to enforce the judgment. The FSIA protects a foreign state's property in
the United States by granting broad immunity from attachment and exe-
cution to satisfy a debt owed as a result of a judgment against the state.287
This immunity from attachment and execution is separate from the im-
munity from jurisdiction. 288 Therefore, "if a sovereign waives immunity
from jurisdiction and a judgment is rendered, the plaintiff can generally
execute the judgment only on property with respect to which the sover-
eign has explicitly waived immunity." 289
The immunity from attachment and execution prevents not only orders
of attachment against the foreign state's property, but also protects the
state from certain pre-judgment security requirements.29° It also protects
from preliminary injunctions that "would serve the same purpose as an
2012) (noting "$3.44 ratio.. . has been established as the standard ratio applicable
to cases arising out of the Beirut bombing"); see also Estate of Brown v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 872 F. Supp. 2d 37, 45 (D.D.C. 2012); Davis v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 882 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2012); O'Brien v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
853 F. Supp. 2d 44, 48 (D.D.C. 2012); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 839 F.
Supp. 2d 263, 267 (D.D.C. 2012).
283. Wyatt, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 233 (D.D.C. 2012); Oveissi, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (D.D.C.
2012); Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2012).
284. Oveissi, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 55-58 (D.D.C. 2012); Wultz, 864 F.Supp.2d 24, 42
(D.D.C. 2012); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
285. Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 789 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2011).
286. Oveissi, 879 F.Supp.2d at 55 (D.D.C. 2012); Wultz, 864 F.Supp.2d at 42 (D.D.C.
2012).
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1609; NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 680 F.3d 254, 257
(2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 273 (2012).
288. Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 516
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (immunity from jurisdiction), with 28
U.S.C. § 1609 (immunity from attachment and execution).
289. Themis Capital, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
290. Pine Top Receivables of Ill., LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, No. 12 C 6357,
2012 WL 6216759, at *4 (N.D. I11. Dec. 13, 2012).
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attachment" by effectively freezing funds immune under the FSIA.291
But the FSIA does not protect foreign states from injunctions that do not
involve "the court's ever exercising dominion over sovereign property,"
such as injunctions that require a sovereign only to comply with existing
contractual obligations without affecting any payment obligations.2 92
The FSIA also creates exceptions to the immunity from attachment
and execution.2 93 Certain property of a foreign state may be executed
upon or attached if: (1) a court authorizes such attachment or execution;
(2) the foreign state's property was used for a commercial activity in the
United States; (3) a reasonable amount of time has passed since a court
entered the judgment to be enforced against the foreign state; (4) the
foreign state was properly given notice of the judgment (if necessary, as
in the case of a default judgment); and (5) the foreign state's property
otherwise satisfies the additional requirements of one of the exceptions to
immunity in Section 1610.294 The additional requirements in Section
1610 include situations where, for example: (1) the foreign state waived
its immunity from attachment; (2) the foreign state's property was used in
the commercial activity that formed the basis of the plaintiff's claim; or
(3) the judgment against the foreign state is based on a court order con-
firming an arbitration award against the state.2 95
Some exceptions to the immunity from attachment and execution, as
well as circumstances where these exceptions do not apply, are discussed
below.
A. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY FROM ATTACHMENT
One key exception to Section 1609's immunity from attachment and
execution is a foreign state's waiver of that immunity.296 The waiver may
be explicit or implicit.2 97 Under Section 1610(b) 298 (which deals with an
291. Janvey v. Libyan Inv. Auth., 478 F. App'x 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2012).
292. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 262 (2d Cir. 2012) (not-
ing the Injunctions at issue directed Argentina "to comply with its contractual obli-
gations not to alter the rank of its payment obligations" and "affect Argentina's
property only incidentally to the effect that the order prohibits Argentina from
transferring money to some bondholders and not others.").
293. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610. But see 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (providing exceptions to exceptions
from immunity in 28 U.S.C. § 1610).
294. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)-(c); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2012) (describing service
of default judgment on foreign state).
295. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1)-(7) (2012).
296. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1).
297. Id.
298. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(1) ("(b) ... any property in the United States of an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United
States shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execu-
tion, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State after
the effective date of this Act, if-(1) the agency or instrumentality has waived its
immunity from attachment in aid of execution or from execution either explicitly
or implicitly, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the agency or instru-
mentality may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver
. . ')
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agency's or instrumentality's waiver of immunity), the waiver of immu-
nity from attachment can affect not only property used by the foreign
state for commercial activity in the United States, but also "any property
in the United States of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
engaged in commercial activity in the United States. 299
A foreign state's waiver of immunity from attachment and execution
can only be withdrawn through "an affirmative act in accordance with the
terms of the original waiver." 30 0 If the terms of the waiver do not "con-
templat[e] the future revocation of a waiver as to attachment of prop-
erty," then the foreign state's waiver of immunity from attachment is
"irrevocable." ' 30 1 In Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of
Congo, the court found that the Republic of Zaire and the Central Bank
of Zaire, who were predecessors in interest to defendants the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the Central Bank of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, had "unambiguously waived immunity of defendants' prop-
erty from execution" in the terms of the credit agreement, under which
plaintiffs were suing. 30 2 The credit agreement stated:
To the extent that the [Republic of Zaire] or the Bank of Zaire may
be entitled . . . to claim for itself or its Assets or the Assets of any
Governmental Agency immunity from suit, from the jurisdiction of
any court... ,from attachment prior to judgment, from execution on
a judgment or from the giving of any other relief or issue of any
process, or to the extent that in any such jurisdiction there may be
attributed such an immunity (whether or not claimed), the [Republic
of Zaire] and the Bank of Zaire each irrevocably agrees not to claim
and irrevocably waives any and all such immunity to the fullest ex-
tent now or hereafter permitted under the laws of the jurisdiction in
which any such suit, action or proceeding may be commenced .... 303
That waiver of immunity from attachment did "not provide a proce-
dure for revocation of that waiver. '304 Therefore, the court found that,
"in accordance with the FSIA, the DRC's waiver of immunity from at-
tachment is ... irrevocable" and therefore there would be no immunity
from attachment.305
B. THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION TO
IMMUNITY FROM ATTACHMENT
Section 1610 of the FSIA creates an exception to immunity from at-
tachment and execution for a foreign state's property when that property
is used for commercial activity in the United States and that property was
299. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1), (b)(1).
300. Themis Capital, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 517; see 28 U.S.C. § 1601(a)(1), (b)(1).
301. Themis Capital, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
302. Id. at 513, 517.
303. Id. at 517-18 (quoting terms of credit agreement and adding emphasis).
304. Id. at 518.
305. Id.
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"used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based. ' ' 3° 6
Thus, "when a foreign government acts .. in the manner of a private
player ... the foreign sovereign's actions are 'commercial' within the
meaning of the FSIA. ' '30 7
1. Defining "Commercial Activity"
To determine whether property falls within the commercial activity ex-
ception to immunity, the court looks at the nature-not purpose-of the
foreign state's course of conduct. 30 8 For instance, a foreign state's
purchasing goods in the market is one common example of commercial
activity "because private companies can similarly use sales contracts to
acquire goods. '30 9 The purpose of those purchases is irrelevant.3 10 The
Second Circuit recently rejected Argentina's argument that funds held in
a New York bank account by ANPCT-a sub-unit of Argentina's Minis-
try of Science, Technology, and Productive Innovation-were immune
from attachment because ANPCT purchased scientific equipment as part
of "national program of scientific research and development."' 31' Argen-
tina asserted that the "essential nature" of ANPCT's payments to equip-
ment sellers was "sovereign" because the equipment was not shipped to
ANPCT or Argentina, but to beneficiaries of research grants.312 The
court found that this argument went to the "governmental purpose" of
the payments, but this purpose was not "relevant to the commercial activ-
ity analysis" because "the relevant inquiry concerns the power that is ex-
ercised, rather than the motive for its exercise. '31 3 Because "a private
party engaged in trade and traffic or commerce can purchase scientific
equipment," ANPCT's purchases "in the manner of a private actor" satis-
fied the commercial use requirement of the FSIA.3 14 Therefore, the
court held that Argentina "may not claim sovereign immunity as to the
funds in the ANPCT Account. '3 15
It is important to remember that the courts have "a great deal of lati-
tude in determining what is a commercial activity for purposes of the
FSIA," and may draw fine distinctions between commercial uses and
non-commercial uses of property.316 For example, a foreign state's licens-
306. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (2012). For a discussion of loss of immunity from suit in the
United States based on commercial activity, see supra section III.B.
307. Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, No. 07 CIV. 2715 TPG,
2012 WL 983564, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (quoting Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted).
308. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 680 F.3d 254, 257-59 (2d Cir. 2012)
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 273 (2012).
309. Id. at 258.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 258-59.
312. Id. at 258.
313. Id. at 259.
314. Id. at 260 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 257 (citing Kato v. Ishihara, 360 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
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ing of patents in the United States in the same manner as any non-sover-
eign patent holder has been found to be a "commercial activity. '317 But
the mere filing of patent applications in the U.S. is "at most the genera-
tion of a property interest, not [a] commercial use," and so the filing of
patent applications may not subject the patents rights to attachment. 318
Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina illustrates the
distinction between the commercial nature of patent licensing and the
non-commercial nature of patent application filing.319 In Aurelius, In-
stituto Nacional de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (INTA), an Argentine gov-
ernmental research institution, developed an herbicide-resistant rice gene
and rice variety, and entered into licensing agreements with a Dutch cor-
poration called BASF B.V.320 Under the licensing agreements, BASF
B.V. was allowed to sell INTA's rice gene and rice variety in most parts of
the world in exchange for royalty payments to INTA. 32 t BASF B.V.'s
parent company, BASF SE, engaged in commercial activity in the United
States, but none of its U.S. products used technology licensed by
INTA.32 2 But two patent applications relating to the rice plants were
filed by BASF in the United States in INTA's name, though BASF did
not plan to commercialize INTA's technologies in the United States.323
The plaintiffs in Aurelius had obtained orders of attachment relating to
the U.S. patents or patent applications, as well as the royalties from the
INTA-BASF licensing agreements. 324 The court found that the mere fil-
ing of patent applications and the grant of patent rights, without any evi-
dence that Argentina "is actively using its patent interests for commercial
activity in the United States," did not subject the patent interests to at-
tachment under the FSIA. 32 5 As for the royalties from the licensing
agreements, a U.S. affiliate of BASF B.V. had paid INTA advance royal-
ties on behalf of BASF B.V. for activities in Costa Rica and Brazil. But
the court characterized the U.S. affiliate's role as that of a "paying agent"
and found there was no indication that the rice gene technology or the
contractual right to receive royalties related to that technology was ever
"put to commercial use in the United States. '326 The court therefore va-
cated the orders attaching the patents and the royalties because the prop-
erty had not been used for commercial activity in the United States as
required by the FSIA. 32 7
317. Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, No. 07 CIV. 2715 TPG,
2012 WL 983564, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (citing Intel Corp. v. Common-
wealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org., 455 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
318. Id. at *5.
319. See generally id.
320. Id. at *3.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at *3-4.
324. Id. at *1.
325. Id. at *5.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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C. EXCEPTIONS TO THE COMMERCIAL AcTIvITY EXCEPTION
1. The Military Activity Exception
Even if a foreign state's property falls within the commercial activity
exception to immunity from attachment, Section 1611 of the FSIA re-
stores immunity to certain property that "is, or is intended to be, used in
connection with a military activity. '328 If that property is "of a military
character" or is "under the control of a military authority or defense
agency," then the intended military activity for that property makes the
property immune from attachment. 329
2. The Central Bank Exception
Section 1611 of the FSIA also immunizes property used for commercial
activity if that property is "of a foreign central bank ... held for its own
account. ' 330 The Second Circuit has adopted a "modified central bank
functions test" to determine when central bank property is held for the
bank's own account.33' Under this test, funds are presumed immune
from attachment under Section 1611 if they are held in an account with
the central bank's name. 332 A plaintiff seeking attachment can "rebut
that presumption by demonstrating with specificity that the funds are not
being used for central banking functions as such functions are normally
understood. ,,333
This test was recently applied in EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina.334
Plaintiffs sought to enforce orders of attachment against funds held by
the Central Bank of Argentina (and Citibank) at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. 335 Argentina had defaulted on certain bonds, but
continued to make payments on certain bonds through CRYL, an Argen-
tine clearing system managed by the Central Bank. 336 The court vacated
the attachment orders that attempted to reach these payments made by
CRYL, holding that "the Republic had no further interest in the funds
designated to pay the [relevant] bonds once it transferred those funds to
CRYL" and therefore "the funds are not property of the Republic and
therefore cannot be attached under § 1610." 337
The court also rejected the argument that the Central Bank's payment
of Argentina's commercial debt in the United States overcame the pre-
sumption that Central Bank funds are immune from attachment under
328. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b) (1996); Aero Union Corp. v. Aircraft Deconstructors Int'l
LLC, No. 1:11-CV-00484-JAW, 2012 WL 3679627 (D. Me. Aug. 24, 2012).
329. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b) (1996).
330. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (1996).
331. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la Republica Argentina, 652 F.3d 172, 194
(2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 23 (2012).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 865 F. Supp. 2d 415, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
335. Id. at 417.
336. Id. at 419.
337. Id. at 424.
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Section 1611 of the FSIA.338 The Second Circuit had previously found
that loans from the Central Bank to the Republic of Argentina did not
transfer title of the Central Bank's assets held in the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York account. 339 Thus, "there was no property of the Re-
public being used for a commercial activity in the United States" and the
Central Bank's funds in the United States remained immune from
attachment. 340
D. ENFORCEMENT IN TERRORISM CASES
For victims of state-sponsored terrorism, the enforcement of judgments
against foreign states presents special problems. Foreign states involved
in terrorism often have very limited assets in the United States, and any
remaining assets may have been seized by the United States, which would
require plaintiffs to litigate against the U.S. government to enforce the
judgment against the foreign state.341 To overcome this "perverse" situa-
tion, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act ("TRIA") to
"subject the assets of terrorist states to attachment and execution in satis-
faction of judgments. '342 Because the TRIA still exempted certain
properties from attachment, Congress subsequently added paragraph (g)
to § 1610 of the FSIA, which now provides that judgments against a ter-
rorist state can be enforced against the property of that foreign state or its
agencies or instrumentalities, regardless of the "level of economic control
over the property by the government of the foreign state. '343
A topic of some dispute among the courts is how to determine whether
an asset is property "of" a terrorist state. Both the TRIA and the FSIA
allow attachment of assets "of" a terrorist state, which has been inter-
preted to mean that the foreign state must have at least an "ownership
interest" in the property to be attached.344 In Estate of Heiser v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, the court applied these principals to the question of
whether survivors of a terrorist bombing attributed to Iran could garnish
funds held in blocked accounts in U.S. banks. The proceeds of Iranian-
related transactions had been blocked pursuant to federal regulations and
were held in Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) accounts in U.S. banks that
served as intermediary banks in those transactions. 345 For some EFTs,
Iran or an Iranian instrumentality functioned as the originator or the
originator's bank for the transfer. 346 The U.S. banks "concede[d] that
338. Id.
339. Id. (citing EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 475-76 (2d Cir. 2007)).
340. Id. at 424.
341. See Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 885 F. Supp. 2d 429, 435 (D.D.C.
2012) afTd, Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
342. Id. at 436.; see generally Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, Pub.L. No. 107-297, 116
Stat. 2322 (2002). TRIA is codified as a note to FSIA Section 1610.
343. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012).
344. Estate of Heiser, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 438, 442; see also TRIA § 201(a) (2002); FSIA
§ 1610(g)(1) (2012).
345. Estate of Heiser, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 430.
346. Id. at 450 n.6.
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Iran has a sufficient ownership interest in these accounts to permit attach-
ment. ' 347 But for other EFrs that were blocked; the only beneficiary's
bank that was supposed to receive the funds was Iranian.348 The court
applied generally adopted principals for EFT property rights under the
Uniform Commercial Code to find that "a creditor of the originator or the
beneficiary cannot levy on the property of either while the property is in
the possession of an intermediary bank . . . because 'midstream EFI's
held by an intermediary bank 'are not the property of either the origina-
tor or the beneficiary.' ' 349 Thus, Iran had at most a contingent future
interest in the funds-an interest sufficient to trigger blocking of the
transfer but insufficient to grant Iran legal title to the funds. The
blocked-midstream EFI's were therefore not subject to attachment under
the FSIA.350
V. PRACTICAL ISSUES IN FSIA LITIGATION
In 2012, FSIA decisions illustrated various procedural issues that arise
in cases brought against foreign sovereigns, including, inter alia: the act of
state doctrine, due process, service of process, jurisdictional issues, venue,
forum non conveniens, default judgments, and interlocutory appeals.
This section contains a brief review of several notable decisions.
A. AcT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine precludes U.S. courts "from inquiring into the
validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power commit-
ted within its own territory."' 35' It applies when "the relief sought or the
defense interposed would [require] a court in the United States to declare
invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own
territory. ' 352 Courts, however, are not required to give deference to
purely commercial acts.353 The foreign entity seeking to invoke the act of
state as an "affirmative defense" has the burden of establishing its
applicability. 35 4
In Konowaloff v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Second Circuit held
that the district court properly granted a motion to dismiss on the basis of
347. Id.
348. Id. at 447.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 448 ("Applying both the Restatement and U.C.C. Article 4A, plaintiffs can-
not show that Iran has any ownership interest in the Contested Accounts.").
351. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d 1066, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1582, 185 L. Ed. 2d 577 (2013) (citing Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964)).
352. McKennson, 672 F.3d at 1073 (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environ-
mental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990).
353. See Best Med. Belgium, Inc. v. Kingdom of Belgium, 913 F. Supp. 2d 230, 237
(E.D. Va. 2012).
354. Konowaloff v. Metro. Museum of Art, 702 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. de-
nied, 133 S. Ct. 2837 (2013); Victims of Hungarian Holocaust v. Hungarian State
Rys., 798 F. Supp. 2d 934, 939 (N.D. I11. 2011) rev'd on other grounds.
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the act of state doctrine where the complaint itself shows that the action
is barred by that doctrine. 3 55 An heir to a Russian national's art collec-
tion sued a museum, seeking return of a painting, as well as compensa-
tory damages for wrongful acquisition, possession, and display of the
painting. 356 The heir alleged that a political party seized power from the
Russian government in 1917 and established the Soviet government that
decreed that the art collection was state property, which then transferred
the art to a state-run museum.3 5 7 When the painting was ultimately sold,
the proceeds were deposited into an account controlled by the Soviet
government. 358 The complaint also alleged that the Soviet state received
official U.S. recognition in 1933. 359 Based on these allegations, the dis-
trict court ruled that the decree designating the art collection as state
property was an act of state that barred the heir's suit.3 60 Although for-
mal recognition of the Soviet government by the United States occurred
years after the decree, the effect of this recognition was to validate all acts
of the Soviet government from the "commencement of its existence," in-
cluding the sovereign expropriation of the art collection. 361
McKesson Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Iran illustrates circum-
stances where the court found the act of state doctrine did not shield Iran
from liability in an action initiated by a U.S. corporation.362 The corpora-
tion alleged that the Iranian government expropriated the corporation's
equity interest in a dairy and illegally withheld dividends. 363 McKesson's
outcome turned on whether the Iranian government's agents took over
the dairy's board of directors, froze out the U.S. corporation, and stopped
paying it dividends-a course of conduct which could be characterized as
"public or official acts of a sovereign government. '364 In assessing the
course of conduct, the court noted, "Iran did not pass a law, issue an edict
or decree, or engage in formal governmental action explicitly taking
property for the benefit of the Iranian public. ' 365 Rather, the U.S. corpo-
ration's claims arose from what resembled a basic "corporate dispute be-
tween majority and minority shareholders. '366 The court therefore held
that the relevant acts were not the "type of public act[s] of a foreign sov-
ereign power" to which the act of state doctrine would apply.367
355. Konowaloff, 702 F.3d at 146.
356. Id. at 143.
357. Id. at 146-47.
358. Id. at 147.
359. Id. at 146.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 143.
362. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2012) cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1582, 185 L Ed. 2d 577 (2013).
363. Id. at 1070.
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B. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Service of process pursuant to the FSIA must comport with 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1608(a) and (b), which detail the acceptable methods of service on for-
eign states, political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities. 368 To ef-
fect proper service on foreign states (or political subdivisions), the
summons and complaint must be transmitted using one of the methods
enumerated in Section 1608(a), in the following preferential order: (1) "in
accordance with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff
and the foreign state"; (2) "in accordance with an applicable international
convention on service of judicial documents"; (3) "by any form of mail,
requiring a signed receipt .... [from] the clerk of the court to the head of
the ministry of foreign affairs"; or (4) by "diplomatic channels" through
the State Department in Washington, D.C.369 If a plaintiff is using the
third or fourth forms of service, the statute requires that the documents
be sent along with translations into the official language of the foreign
state.3
70
Ordinarily, strict compliance with this rule is essential to succeed in an
action governed by the FSIA.371 But in some cases, such as Angellino v.
Royal Family Al-Saud, pro se litigants are afforded "more latitude than
litigants represented by counsel to correct defects in service of pro-
cess. '372 Angellino, an artist, filed a pro se breach of contract suit against
the Saudi royal family and sixteen members of the royal family for failure
to pay for 29 sculptures that the family allegedly had commissioned. 373
At the time of service in 2010, the defendants were considered an
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under Section 1608 of the
FSIA.374 Angellino ordinarily communicated with the defendants
through the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia located in Washington,
D.C.375 He argued that he had served defendants by a "special arrange-
ment" under Section 1608(a), which was the parties' usual means of
transaction and communication.376 Nevertheless, the district court dis-
missed Angellino's complaint without prejudice for failure to prosecute
based on his failure to demonstrate that he had served a political subdivi-
sion of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pursuant to a "special arrangement
for service" under FSIA § 1608(a). 377 Specifically, the district court cited
"his failure to attempt one of the alternative methods of service pre-
scribed in § 1608(a)," and "his failure to serve the members of the Royal
368. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a), (b).
369. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1)-(4). Sequential service of process requirements also exist
for service on agencies and instrumentalities under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b).
370. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3), (4).
371. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608
372. Angellino v. Royal Family Al-Saud, 688 F.3d 771, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. de-
nied, 133 S. Ct. 851, 184 L. Ed. 2d 656 (2013).
373. Id. at 773.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. See id. at 774.
377. See id. at 775.
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Family pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 4(f)."1378
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's ruling for abuse of discre-
tion, although the D.C. Circuit agreed "that Angellino was required to
serve process on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under § 1608(a) and on
the sixteen defendant Royal Family members under FRCP 4(f). ' 379 The
court stated that a dismissal for failure to prosecute due to a delay in
service is appropriate only when there is no "reasonable probability" that
service can be obtained or there is a "lengthy period of inactivity. '380
Here, the plaintiff's inability to effect service did not result from his inac-
tivity, as he repeatedly attempted to serve process. 381 Further, as a pro se
litigant, he was not given the required fair notice from the district court of
service requirements under Section 1608 or the consequences of not ob-
taining service.382 The court noted that "there exists a 'reasonable
probability' that Angellino can effect service given the success of other
parties in serving process on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under
§ 1608(a)(3) and (4) [of the FSIA]. '383
With respect to service on agencies or instrumentalities, a plaintiff need
not follow the requirements of Section 1608(b) as closely as with a for-
eign state or political subdivision; only "substantial compliance" with the
service rules is required.384 Thus, some courts have allowed a case to
proceed based on "'technically faulty service' [under § 1608(b)] as long as
the defendants receive adequate notice of the suit and are not
prejudiced. '385
C. DUE PROCESS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The majority of courts that have addressed the issue have held that, for
purposes of the FSIA, foreign states are not "persons" protected by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.386 Accordingly, foreign
378. Id.
379. Id. at 776, 788.
380. See id. at 776-77.
381. Id. at 777.
382. Id. at 778.
383. Id. at 776.
384. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed'n, 798 F. Supp. 2d 260, 269
(D.D.C. 2011).
385. Id. (quoting Doe v. State of Isr. 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 102 (D.D.C. 2005)).
386. GSS Grp. Ltd v. Nat'l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Cont'l Cas.
Co. v. Argentine Republic, 893 F. Supp. 2d 747, 752 n.12 (E.D. Va. 2012) ("Every
circuit court to address the issue has held 'that foreign states are not "persons"
protected by the Fifth Amendment .... '). See also, e.g., Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's London v. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 811 F. Supp.
2d 53, 72 (D.C.C. 2011) (quotation omitted); Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State
Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 2009); Price v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Baker v. So-
cialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 775 F. Supp. 2d 48, 77 (D.D.C. 2011);
O'Bryan v. Holy See, 471 F. Supp. 2d 784, 794 (W.D. Ky. 2007); Cassirer v. King-
dom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Rux v. Republic of
Sudan, No. CIV.A. 2:04CV428, 2005 WL 2086202, at *18 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2005);
Cruz v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Altmann v.
Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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states typically may not invoke lack of due process as a defense in FSIA
litigation. The consequence for a foreign state is that it is "not subject to
the minimum contacts analysis prior to the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion. '3 87 Thus, after subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA has been
established and defendants are properly served pursuant to the require-
ments of 28 U.S.C. § 1608, the court will assert personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. 388
But the inapplicability of due process protection to foreign states in
FSIA actions does not necessarily extend to foreign agencies or instru-
mentalities. 3 89 In 2012, the D.C. Circuit considered whether a public for-
eign entity-e.g., a corporation owned and operated by a foreign
government-could rely on a due process argument to avoid personal ju-
risdiction. In GSS Group Ltd. v. National Port Authority,390 the district
court determined that a Liberian public corporation, which specifically
held itself out as independent from its sovereign, was entitled to due pro-
cess protections, while the Liberian government was not.39 1 The D.C.
Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that because no one had contested
that the corporation was an independent juridical entity, it was a "per-
son" entitled to due process protection, and consequently, had a right to
assert a minimum contacts defense. 392 Thus, a public foreign entity, sepa-
rately and independently from its sovereign, may be entitled to the same
due process protections as a private foreign entity with respect to per-
sonal jurisdiction in U.S. courts. This norm may be overcome under a
variety of circumstances, such as where a foreign-government-owned
"corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relation-
ship of principal and agent is created," or where honoring the distinction
between instrumentality and sovereign "would work fraud or
injustice." 393
387. Cont'l Cas. Co, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 752 n.12.
388. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1976); see also Concesionaria Dominicana de Autopistas y
Carreteras, S.A. v. Dominican State, No. 12-CV-1335 RLW, 2012 WL 6632812
(D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2012) (finding personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereign and
stating that personal jurisdiction under FSIA exists when court concludes that it
has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to one of the statute's exceptions and that
the plaintiff has complied with the service of process requirements set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 1608); Blue Ridge Invs., LLC v. Republic of Arg., 902 F. Supp. 2d 367,
376 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), affd sub nom, Blue Ridge Invs., L.L.C. v. Republic of Arg.,
735 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013) (same).
389. See Smith v. Ghana Commercial Bank, Ltd., No. CIV. 10-4655 DWF/JJK, 2012
WL 2930462, at *6 (D. Minn. June 18, 2012), report and recommendation adopted,
No. CIV. 10-4655 DWF/JJK, 2012 WL 2923543 (D. Minn. July 18, 2012), affd
(Dec. 7, 2012) (dismissing complaint against Ghana Commercial Bank because
plaintiff did not allege sufficient minimum contacts with forum state such that
court could establish general or specific jurisdiction over Ghana Commercial
Bank).
390. GSS Grp. Ltd v. Nat'l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
391. Id. at 809-10.
392. Id. at 817.
393. Id. at 814 (quoting First Nat'l City Bank v. Bano Para el Comercio Exterior de
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983).
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First Investment Corporation v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding illustrates
how a personal jurisdiction analysis under the FSIA may affect parties
involved in international arbitration. 394 In First Investment, the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed a district court's decision to deny confirmation of a foreign
arbitral award against a Chinese state-owned entity and a private corpo-
ration whose majority shareholder was the state-owned entity (together,
the "Fujian entities") for lack of personal jurisdiction. 395 The court re-
jected the plaintiff's argument that a lack of personal jurisdiction is not a
ground for non-recognition of an arbitral award and that constitutional
due process concerns therefore are not implicated in a confirmation pro-
ceeding under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "New York Conven-
tion").396 Specifically, the court held that "dismissal of a petition under
the New York Convention for lack of personal jurisdiction is appropriate
as a matter of constitutional due process. '397 The court also rejected the
plaintiff's argument that it was erroneous to dismiss a foreign sovereign's
alter egos for lack of personal jurisdiction because foreign sovereigns are
not entitled to due process protections as a predicate for a federal court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction.398 Because the plaintiff did not present
sufficient evidence that the Fujian entities were the alter egos of the Chi-
nese government, the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction was properly granted.399
D. JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY
A request for jurisdictional discovery is common in FSIA cases, where
further fact-finding may be necessary to establish that the foreign entity
falls within one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity. Jurisdictional
discovery is usually permitted only when the plaintiff is able to carry its
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that jurisdiction exists.400
Because "the FSIA's immunity provisions aim to protect foreign sover-
eigns from the burdens of litigation, including the cost and aggravation of
discovery," courts are often disinclined to require foreign sovereigns to
participate in discovery.40 1 If a ruling denying jurisdictional discovery is
appealed, the decision "will not be reversed except upon the clearest
showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial
394. First Inv. Corp. of Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d
742, 756 (5th Cir. 2012), as revised (Jan. 17, 2013).
395. Id. at 745, 756.
396. Id. at 748.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 752.
399. Id. at 754-55.
400. Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
401. Lantheus Med. Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 769, 779
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Thai Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co., v. Gov't of the Lao Peo-
ple's Democratic Republic, No. 10 Civ. 5256 KMW, 2011 WL 4111504, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2011)).
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prejudice to the complaining litigant. '40 2 In Seijas v. Republic of Argen-
tina, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of jurisdic-
tional discovery to ascertain whether Banco de la Naci6n Argentina
("BNA") was an alter ego of Argentina, and therefore liable for its
debt.40 3 BNA, a commercial bank wholly owned by Argentina, qualified
for sovereign immunity as Argentina's "agency or instrumentality. '40 4
Plaintiffs made two arguments that exceptions to BNA's immunity ap-
plied-both relying on an "alter ago theory": (1) Argentina's "waiver of
immunity with respect to litigation arising from its default on its sover-
eign debt is imputed to BNA as an alter ego of the Republic;" and (2)
Argentina's "commercial activity is imputed to BNA as an alter ego of
the Republic. '40 5 The Second Circuit found that plaintiffs' "allegations
[were] insufficient to establish the extensive control necessary to sustain
an alter ego claim or even to establish a reasonable basis for assuming
jurisdiction;" and so the denial of jurisdictional discovery was proper.40 6
In Aero Union Corp. v. Aircraft Deconstructors International LLC, the
issue was whether limited discovery was appropriate to determine
whether a military-grade aircraft owned by Brazil was immune to pre-
judgment attachment. 40 7 The plaintiff argued that limited jurisdictional
discovery was "necessary to explore possible waivers of sovereign immu-
nity" by the Brazilian Air Command and "the facts underlying the as-
serted immunity. '40 8 The critical question was whether the aircraft was
used for a commercial purpose and could therefore be attached under
Section 1610, or whether the aircraft was immune from attachment under
Section 1611 because it was being used, or would be used, for a military
purpose.40 9 The court acknowledged the "tension between permitting
discovery to substantiate exceptions to [the FSIA] and protecting a sover-
eign's ... legitimate claim to immunity from discovery."' 4 10 Nevertheless,
limited discovery "only to verify allegations of specific facts crucial to
[the] immunity determination" was permissible because it would not un-
duly burden the foreign sovereign.4 1
In EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, to facilitate a judgment creditor's
execution of its judgments against Argentina, the Second Circuit ordered
402. Doe v. Holy See, No. CV 02-430-MO, 2011 WL 1541275, at *2 (D. Or. Apr. 21,
2011) (quoting Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008)).
403. Seijas v. Republic of Argentina, 502 F. App'x 19, 20-21 (2d Cir. 2012).
404. Id. at 20.
405. Seijas v. Republic of Argentina, No. 10 CIV. 4300 TPG, 2011 WL 1137942, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011) affd, 502 Fed. App'x. 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
406. Seijas, 2012 WL 5259030 at *21-22. Plaintiffs claimed that Argentina could ap-
point and remove BNA's directors, BNA made loans in Argentina's political inter-
est, and that BNA's financial records were opaque. Taken together, these
allegations did not satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of showing an "abuse of corporate
form" sufficient to overcome presumption of separate legal personality. Id.
407. Aero Union Corp. v. Aircraft Deconstructors Int'l LLC, No. 1:11-CV-00484-JAW,
2012 WL 3679627, at *1 (D. Me. Aug. 24, 2012).
408. Id. at *5.
409. Id. at *7.
410. Id. at *8.
411. Id.
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asset discovery from third parties in connection with property owned by
Argentina outside the United States.412 The court reasoned that asset
discovery did not implicate Argentina's sovereign immunity because it:
(1) only mandated the production of information and not the attachment
of sovereign asset itself;4 13 and (2) was directed at third-party banks with
no claim to any immunity, not at Argentina itself.414 The court acknowl-
edged that the district court could not attach Argentinean assets located
abroad, but a "district court's power to order discovery to enforce its
judgment does not derive from its ultimate ability to attach the property
in question but from its power to conduct supplementary proceedings,
involving persons indisputably within its jurisdiction, to enforce valid
judgments. '415
E. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
Where a foreign sovereign does not answer or otherwise defend itself
against a complaint, a court may grant a default judgment in favor of the
plaintiff.4 16 Before a court will enter a default judgment, though, the
court must be satisfied that the plaintiffs have established their right to
relief through evidence. 4 17 The court may accept all uncontroverted evi-
dence as true, which may take the form of sworn affidavits or prior tran-
scripts. A court may also take judicial notice of findings and conclusions
in related proceedings. 41 8
F. VENUE AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f), claims against a foreign state, or political
subdivision thereof, may be brought in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, or "any judicial district" where (1) "a substantial
part of the events ... or a substantial part of property... is situated;" (2)
"the vessel or cargo of a foreign state is situated;" or (3) "the agency or
instrumentality is licensed to do business. '419 Venue disputes in FSIA
litigation typically concern the location where "a substantial part of the
events" occurred. 420
412. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2012).
413. Id. at 208.
414. Id. at 210.
415. Id. at 208.
416. See, e.g., Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Reed
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 845 F. Supp. 2d 204, 208 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding Iran
liable for terrorist acts after entry of default judgment where Iran failed to respond
to Complaint).
417. Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216,219 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1608(e)).
418. See Fain v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 856 F. Supp. 2d 109, 115 (D.D.C. 2012) (grant-
ing plaintiffs' motion for default judgment against Iran after taking on judicial no-
tice of findings in related proceedings).
419. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (2011).
420. See, e.g., Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Bureau for Representing Ukrainian In-
terests in Int'l & Foreign Courts, 898 F. Supp. 2d 301, 317-18 (D. Mass. 2012),
afjd, 727 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2013) (finding that venue was proper in District of Mas-
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But it is not guaranteed that the proper venue for an FSIA action al-
ways will lie in the United States. Under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, a defendant seriously inconvenienced by a particular venue may
urge the court to decline to hear the case in the plaintiff's chosen fo-
rum. 421 "Considering whether to dismiss a case pursuant to the doctrine
of forum non conveniens involves a two-step analysis. ' 422 "The first step
in the forum non conveniens analysis is establishing an adequate alterna-
tive forum;" the second requires determining whether a balancing of vari-
ous private and public interest factors strongly favors dismissal.42 3 The
determination is highly discretionary, and courts may deny foreign sover-
eigns' motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. 424
For example, in Skanga Energy & Marine Ltd. v. Arevenca S.A, where
a Nigerian corporation sought a refund of $11.12 million from a Venezue-
lan state-owned energy corporation for non-delivery of petroleum prod-
ucts, the defendant Venezuelan company argued for dismissal because
both Nigeria and Venezuela provided an adequate alternate forum.
425
The court performed the two-step analysis to determine whether the suit
should be dismissed under forum non conveniens. The court found it
"unnecessary ... to decide whether Venezuela and Nigeria are adequate
alternative fora; even assuming that they are, the balancing of private and
public interest factors tip decisively in favor of [the plaintiff's] forum
choice," which was entitled to "considerable deference. '4
26
In evaluating the private interests at stake, the court noted that the
bulk of the evidence and witnesses were located in the United States and
Venezuela, not in Nigeria. 427 The private interests "bearing on the par-
ties' convenience [were] evenly balanced between New York and Vene-
zuela, and tip[ped] decidedly against litigation in Nigeria. '428 Because
the defendants allegedly "availed themselves of the protection of the
New York banking system to perpetrate a fraud," and New York "has a
great interest in the integrity of its banking system," the court found that
"[s]ubstantial public interest factors favor retention of this case in New
York. '429 The court ultimately denied the defendant's motion to dismiss
sachusetts in a contractor's suit against agencies or instrumentalities of the Repub-
lic of Ukraine, where contractor's performance in Massachusetts was a significant
component of the contract claims and constituted an event giving rise to the
claims).
421. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, Forum Non Conveniens (9th ed. 2009).
422. See DRFP, LLC v. Republica Bolivariana De Venezuela, No. 2:04-CV-00793, 2012
WL 5252306, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2012) (internal citations omitted).
423. See id. (listing factors)
424. See id. at *3, *10 (deferring to U.S. plaintiff's choice of U.S. forum where only
some factors weighed in favor of Venezuela as a forum).
425. Skanga Energy & Marine Ltd. v. Arevenca S.A., 875 F. Supp. 2d 264, 266, 273-74
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), affd sub nom, Skanga Energy & Marine Ltd. v. Petroleos de
Venezuela S.A., 522 F. App'x 88 (2d Cir. 2013).
426. Id. at 273-74.
427. Id. at 274.
428. Id. 274-75.
429. Id. at 275.
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and deferred to the plaintiff's choice of New York as the forum.43
0
G. INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
In 2012, two circuits addressed issues relating to interlocutory appeals
in FSIA cases. 43 1 The Ninth Circuit addressed whether it could hear an
appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss where the district court had
transferred the matter to a district court in another circuit.432 The Second
Circuit addressed whether a judgment creditor's motion to compel non-
party banks to comply with subpoenas duces tecum, seeking information
about sovereigns assets located abroad, was immediately appealable
under collateral order doctrine. 43
3
In Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, "two Cyprus oil brokerage companies
sued the Republic of Iraq for unilaterally terminating two contracts for
the purchase and sale of Iraqi oil."' 434 Iraq moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, among other grounds. 435 The Central District
of California denied Iraq's motion and, after concluding that venue was
improper, transferred the case to the District of Columbia. 4 36 Iraq ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit, although the notice of appeal was not filed
until after the case was docketed in the District of Columbia.437 The
plaintiff argued that after the transferee court dockets the case files, the
transferor court and its appellate court lose jurisdiction over the case. 438
Rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit concluded, "[a] district court's
transfer of a case to an out-of-circuit district court does not strip an appel-
late court of jurisdiction over an interlocutory but 'immediately appeala-
ble, and timely appealed, decision' of a district court within its circuit.
439
In EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, the Second Circuit ruled that a
discovery order directing two non-party banks to provide information
concerning property owned by defendant Argentina was immediately ap-
pealable under the collateral order doctrine. 440 Even though a discovery
order normally is not a final decision, and therefore usually not appeala-
ble, the appellate court found that the discovery order was the district
court's final determination that extraterritorial asset discovery did not in-
fringe on Argentina's sovereign immunity.441 The issue of the scope of
discovery was also separate from the merits of the case.44 2 Finally, if that
430. Id.
431. See Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 64 (2013); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 205-
06 (2d Cir. 2012).
432. Terenkian, 694 F.3d at 1129-30.
433. EM Ltd., 695 F.3d at 202-03, 205-06.
434. Terenkian, 694 F.3d at 1125.
435. Id. at 1128.
436. Id. at 1129.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 1129-30.
440. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2012).
441. Id. at 206.
442. Id.
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discovery order were not appealable, then Argentina would be "unable to
obtain effective review in a United States court of the Discovery Order
through a later appeal of a final judgment."' 4 4 3 Argentina also did not
have the option of obtaining review through "disobedience and con-
tempt" because the discovery order was directed at third parties, not Ar-
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